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Abstract 
The DoD’s evolutionary acquisition policy is directed against project risk, but 
bears inherent risks of its own. The DoD policy for evolutionary acquisition mandates 
multiple product releases via spiral (i.e., amorphous & unplanned) or incremental 
(i.e., defined & deferred) development methodologies for all programs. All 
amorphous spirals eventually become definitive increments. Incremental 
development entails the deliberate deferral of work to a subsequent phase. 
Computational organizational modeling using systems dynamics reveals that this 
methodology introduces more concurrency during development, and more variety in 
production. The result is earlier delivery of the first increment, but with later and 
more costly delivery of subsequent increments than if conducted via a single-step 
methodology. Curtailments of scope by the exclusive use of mature technology 
enable more effective delivery of the first increment, further illustrated by two case 
studies. Duplication, rework, transaction costs, decision backlog and error are 
causes of inefficiency in the successive increments. Production variety and mixed 
configurations produce obvious implications for logistical supportability, training, 
failure causality, compatibility and interoperability, etc. Further, certain attributes of 
hardware products might help determine the suitability of this development 
methodology. Products that are nearly immutable, which have binary requirements 
for key capabilities, require man-rating, or are maintenance-intensive may not be 
good candidates for incremental development. Mutable products with costless 
production, continuous requirements, low maintenance, or time criticality are more 
likely to reap advantages from this development approach. While modular open 
systems architecture facilitates system adaptation, modularity itself does not 
necessarily create evolutionary advantages, due to relative modular 
interdependency. Program managers must be aware of the inherent risks of these 
agile acquisition methods and take additional steps to balance them with appropriate 
planning and resources, disciplined change-control measures, organizational 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - ii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Keywords: Evolutionary acquisition, spiral development, incremental product 
development, Javelin, ATACMS, agile development methodologies, computational 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - iii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Acknowledgements 
The authors wish to acknowledge the leaders of the NPS Acquisition 
Research Program: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret) and Dr. Keith Snider, as 
well as the tireless efforts of Karey Shaffer, her assistant David Wood and editorial 
team, without whose support we could not have conducted this research into the 























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - v - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
About the Authors 
John T. Dillard joined the NPS faculty in the fall of 2000 with extensive 
experience in the field of systems acquisition management. His research focuses on 
defense acquisition policy changes and their implications. Dillard began his career in 
program and contract management after attaining a MS in Systems Management 
from the University of Southern California in 1985.  He has been involved with 
myriad technologies and system concepts that have evolved into fielded products: 
such as the M-4 Carbine, 120mm Mortar, and M-24 Sniper Weapon.  He was the 
Assistant Project Manager for Research & Development of both the Army Tactical 
Missile System and the JAVELIN Anti-tank Weapon System at Redstone Arsenal, 
Alabama. He was the Product Manager for the Joint Advanced Special Operations 
Radio System, and in 1998 was appointed to head Defense Department contract 
administration in the New York metropolitan area.  As an adjunct professor for the 
University of California at Santa Cruz, he teaches courses in project management 
and leadership to Silicon Valley public- and private-industry professionals. 
John T. Dillard 
Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5197 
Phone: (831) 656-2650 
E-mail: jdillard@nps.edu  
David N. Ford received his BS and MS from Tulane University, New Orleans, 
LA, and his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge. He is 
a Professor in the Construction Engineering and Management Program, Zachry 
Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station. Prior this 
position, he was on the Faculty of the Department of Information Science, University 
of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, where he researched and taught in the System 
Dynamics Program. For over 14 years, he designed and managed the development 
of constructed facilities in industry and government. His current research interests 
include the dynamics of development projects and supply chains, strategic 
managerial flexibility, and resource-allocation policies. Dr. Ford is a member of 
INFORMS, ASCE, and other professional organizations. 
David N. Ford, Ph.D., P.E. 
Zachry Department of Civil Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
College Station, TX 77843-3136  
Voice: (979) 845-3759 


































From Amorphous to Defined: Balancing the Risks of Spiral 
Development 
30 April 2007 
by 
John T. Dillard, Senior Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
David N. Ford, PhD, PE 
Zachry Department of Civil Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - ix- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table of Contents 
Executive Summary ................................................................................xi 
Background .................................................................................... xi 
Questions about Policy Implications...............................................xii 
Development Case Studies ...........................................................xiii 
Computational Modeling of Spiral Development............................xiv 
Observations and Assessments ....................................................xvi 
Recommendations for Practice .....................................................xvi 
Discussion ....................................................................................xvii 
Conclusions................................................................................. xviii 
Introduction—The Inevitability of Change .............................................1 
New Terminology and a Mandate for Variety.........................................3 
Reducing Cycle-time and a Move toward Evolutionary 
Requirements ...........................................................................................8 
The Enabler: Mature Technology Reduces Risk .................................12 
Policy Concerns .....................................................................................17 
Implementation Concerns .....................................................................19 
The Costs and Benefits of Variety ........................................................24 
Do Product Attributes Affect Spiral Applicability and 
Outcomes? .............................................................................................30 
Mutability .......................................................................................31 
User Risk (Safety and Time Criticality) ..........................................35 
Logistical Support during Service/Shelf Life ..................................39 
Range of Requirement Attainment ................................................39 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - x- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The RAND Study of Evolutionary Acquisition in DoD Space 
Programs ................................................................................................43 
Anecdotal Clues for Coping with Variety and Complexity .................47 
Observations and Realizations from Historical Cases .......................51 
ATACMS—Incremental and Spiral Development ..........................51 
The Javelin Project—Single Step to Full Capability.......................59 
Synthesis of the Cases..................................................................65 
Modeling Evolutionary Acquisition ......................................................67 
The Modeling Approach ................................................................67 
A Formal Model of Spiral Development .........................................76 
Model Calibration and Testing.......................................................84 
Model Use ...............................................................................................91 
The Impacts of Incremental Development on Acquisition 
Project Performance......................................................................91 
Causal Analysis and Explanations of Model Behavior...................94 
Investigating Incremental/Spiral Development Management.........99 
The Critical Role of Progress Bottlenecks ...................................100 
Simulation Modeling Results Summary .......................................103 
Balancing Risks with Development Approaches ..............................106 
Conclusions..........................................................................................110 
Recommendations for Practice: ..................................................114 
References............................................................................................115 
Appendix 1. UH-60 Series Helicopter Variants Introduced 
Between 1979-2007 ..............................................................................124 
Appendix 2. C-130 Hercules Aircraft Variants Introduced 
Between 1956-2007 ..............................................................................127 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - xi- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Executive Summary 
Our purpose in this research was to discover what spiral development really 
is, observe it in past programs, model it, and make predictions and 
recommendations for program managers. Program managers typically seek stability, 
in requirements, funding, system design, and production configuration. But it seems 
the only constant is change. Like the aspects of being temporary and unique, 
progressive elaboration is a project characteristic, and also a technique for 
incremental discovery of requirements and product utility.  
Background 
There are many new DoD terms for project management and product 
development methods. DoD promulgated evolutionary acquisition (EA) as policy in 
2000, and soon after, spiral development for the preferred acquisition strategy of all 
materiel. EA’s goal is to phase requirements and provide capability sooner. But there 
has been confusion over terms, despite further elaboration and even codification in 
statute, and it still persists today, along with a lack of full understanding of many 
policy implications – especially some inherent risks. EA operationally means there 
will always be multiple product releases of an item. 
The policy thrust is primarily about the reduction of product cycle time within 
an uncertain environment, by exclusively using mature technology. DoD’s 
requirements process has also followed with “evolutionary” requirements documents 
– a new idea. Uncertainty is the usual realm of program managers, especially in 
defense systems, and is usually dealt with by seeking best information. Earlier 
reform initiatives were aimed at overcoming information gaps and technology lag. 
For example, the 1990’s Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
initiative was about gaining collective wisdom for early and complete requirements 
realization. However, the current paradigm is to allow uncertainty in requirements to 
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also urged the DoD to move toward Knowledge-Based Acquisition, with Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRL) as the rubric for program initiation (advanced development). 
Thus, the heart of EA is the exclusive use of mature technology to reduce project 
scope.  
Questions about Policy Implications 
EA outcomes are as yet unknown, and some authors have already had 
insightful strategic and institutional concerns. We have also had tactical 
(implementation) concerns about excessive decision bureaucracy, organizational 
challenges from multiple and concurrent development efforts, old technology at 
release, funds forecasting, transaction costs, and maintenance of subsequent 
increment priority.  
Spiral development as a one-size-fits all strategy may not be appropriate. 
Variety adds complexity in production and is costly, for hardware owners and 
manufacturers alike. Both concurrency and variety are elements of program 
complexity and risk. Traditional views about late design changes are negative, 
except for producibility enhancements and savings. But market consumers often 
need items in rapid cycle times and appreciate product differentiation. In support of 
EA policy, the GAO has used product examples such as commercial vehicles, which 
ignore the aspect of ownership.  
Control measures are used to manage risk. One way of coping with the 
complexities of variety in ownership is via organizational and individual 
accountability, and we use examples of these with illustrations of recent small arms 
variety and Rickover’s nuclear Navy. Many other useful theorems on systems 
complexity, change and control exist.  
More questions about spiral development include whether certain product 
characteristics determine spiral development method applicability. Mutability 
simplifies change, and spiral development was conceived for the most malleable of 
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allay software project risk. And that idea can be extended in the case of DoD 
projects. Time criticality and life-saving dependency, as opposed to user hazard 
levels (safety & man-rating), might influence design approaches. We believe this is 
why space experts say they’ll not use spiral development with NASA’s new Crew 
Exploration Vehicle project. Regarding product size or production quantity, we find 
no evidence that either precludes use of spiral development – as with space vehicles 
and large ships -- though support considerations do arise with variety that could 
greatly affect total costs of ownership. Regarding “range of requirement attainment,” 
binary key performance parameters could fall upon the critical path, making division 
into capability increments less beneficial. Increment phasing (the amount of 
concurrency) and cycle time (lead time) affect program complexity, budgeting, 
organizational stress, etc. Simon’s views on complexity and evolution of systems 
involved hierarchy and modularity within architecture, but fail to emphasize modular 
interdependency. We cannot yet model these product attributes, but can illustrate 
most of them with examples from our case studies. 
Development Case Studies 
One of the most recent monographs we have found on emerging results of 
evolutionary acquisition is by RAND – on five immature, non-man-rated space 
systems. Space systems are somewhat different (in quantities, space environment, 
front-end investment, and extended technology development periods). RAND also 
found that policy confusion persists, and that EA added program complexity and 
uncertainty, especially with regard to budgeting. Extending their findings to non-
space DoD programs, RAND highlighted the EA challenges of programmatic flux. 
They feel, and we agree, that EA presents the opportunity for typical PM challenges 
to be even more formidable.  
Two missile programs were used as case studies for analysis and to illustrate 
planned and unplanned change. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) used  
both incremental and spiral strategies for product development. The program 
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leap-ahead capability in range. It arrived on budget and schedule, with several 
successive variants, pre-planned and unplanned. One instance of production 
change caused missile failure and costly refit of already produced missiles – 
underscoring the need for more thorough design specification and configuration 
management accountability.  
Javelin used the single-step-to-full-capability approach to product 
development. The program embarked upon advanced development with immature 
technologies in several critical areas, causing significant cost and schedule 
overruns. It also has experienced subsequent design changes and product variety, 
more so as running production changes than as product variants.  
Synthesis of these cases conveys that as an approach oriented primarily for 
reduction of product cycle time, spiral development can successfully be used when 
developing mature technologies first. But that a system’s physical properties like 
mutability, along with other factors such as time criticality (user risk), and modular 
interdependency will drive spiral development applicability. And key capabilities may 
in fact depend upon the least mature technologies or even binary requirements, 
which we describe as attained/unattained (versus continuous). An “open,” or at least 
elegant, architecture is key to form a basis for modular variety, and thorough design 
specification and configuration management accountability is essential for managing 
the complexity of multiple product releases. All amorphous spirals will eventually 
become defined increments, and even then may be popularly termed as “spirals.” 
Other well-known programs have used a spiral approach over their long product life 
spans, but often having rather successive (versus highly concurrent) phasing of their 
development increments.  
Computational Modeling of Spiral Development 
Using system dynamics, our computational modeling of spiral versus a single-
step methodology yields results that illustrate our implementation concerns. Spiral 
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requirements satisfied earlier than single-block development. However, spiral 
development takes more time and costs more to satisfy all requirements than single-
block development. Spiral development has a high risk of not satisfying all 
requirements by the time single-block development can satisfy all requirements. 
The concurrent use of multiple development blocks in spiral development 
significantly increases the number of development phases and activities that must 
be managed and coordinated at any given time compared to single-block 
development. This increases the project management needs for successful 
acquisition in spiral development projects when compared to single-block projects.  
As in single-block development, progress in spiral development requires the 
identification and understanding of progress bottlenecks. The concurrence and 
resulting complexity of development in spiral projects causes the types and locations 
of bottlenecks to vary widely and be more difficult to identify and address than in 
single-block development. Causal paths of the drivers and constraints on project 
performance and progress bottlenecks pass through multiple types of resources, 
development processes, and move across both development phases and 
development blocks. These causal paths vary widely for different performance 
measures. They also change as projects evolve. This makes the drivers of and 
constraints on spiral acquisition project performance more difficult to identify than in 
single-block development projects. Progress bottlenecks can cause counterintuitive 
behavior, such as reductions in project cost by adding resources at a bottleneck. 
Understanding and exploiting the opportunities provided by these behaviors requires 
a deep understanding of the project structures and dynamic interactions that drive 
and constrain progress. Our modeling results indicate that spiral development is a 
significantly different approach to acquisition than single-block development, and 
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Observations and Assessments 
Evolutionary acquisition seeks to spread out the technical risk over more 
development and process time via incrementing. We have shown with simulation 
that this can potentially improve risk management performance initially, but with 
higher overall costs and longer subsequent development durations.  Our 
computational modeling indicates that incremental development costs more and 
requires more time to provide the same requirements than single step development. 
With regard to project risk, the increased complexity in a project using an 
incremental or spiral approach makes the isolation and effective management of 
progress bottlenecks more difficult than in single-step development. 
The policy change is that spiral development now includes undefinitized 
increments and prescribes incremental development instead of single step 
development. All amorphous spirals will eventually become defined increments – in 
effect mini-programs. In years past they have often been implemented as sequential, 
separate, and successive product upgrades (such as the CH-47, UH-60, C-130, B-
52 program examples). But current policy expresses these as more concurrent, 
frequent and continuous. Such concurrency adds complexity to development 
models, with attendant risks of over allocation of work, noise, error, duplication, and 
other inefficiencies from work deferral and divided effort in project management 
organizations. Additional oversight, reviews, contracting, testing, etc. will also likely 
affect transaction costs. If all requirements are known and an incremental approach 
is used, then there is a deliberate deferral of work to later increments and there will 
be a resultant increase in total development costs and durations for these same 
reasons. 
Recommendations for Practice 
1. Project managers need to be aware of the inherent risks of spiral 
development and take necessary precautions to balance those risks. 
Many tools and control measures are currently developed and 
available to assist project managers in balancing the risks of spiral 
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management, technology performance management, real options, 
project phasing, risk management, earned value management and 
organizational design.  
2. Incremental and spiral development projects provide additional 
opportunities for managing development risks that are inherent in the 
project design. These include project planning decisions about the 
number and concurrency of development blocks, and the requirements 
and associated technologies and design components to be included in 
specific blocks. This planning provides opportunities to anticipate 
where critical progress bottlenecks may occur and design how to best 
monitor and respond to them.  
3. Product attributes may help determine the suitability of spiral 
development. PMs should consider such characteristics as: mutability, 
time criticality, man-rating, modular interdependency, key parameters 
of capability versus range of requirement attainment (i.e. binary vs. 
continuous), and the relative amount of concurrency among 
increments.  
4. Progress bottlenecks in incremental and spiral development often 
oscillate between process constraints (e.g. availability of work due to 
upstream progress) and resource constraints (e.g. developer or project 
management quantities or productivities). Successfully addressing a 
constraining progress bottleneck often shifts the progress constraint to 
a different location in the project. Therefore, a structured and 
interdisciplinary practice of identifying and addressing bottlenecks can 
improve performance.  
5. Configuration management accountability must be assigned and kept 
to maintain supportability, failure mode identification and causality and 
prevent the variety generated by evolutionary acquisition from reducing 
total product performance. 
Discussion  
Boehm’s latest book on software development advocates balancing 
disciplined (more rigid) and agile (more flexible) methods to capitalize on the 
benefits of both. Discipline is needed as a control mechanism to avoid risk, but 
agility is needed to respond quickly to customer needs. Saying, “One size fits all is a 
myth,” he advocates a balanced approach based upon risk. Consistent with our 
findings, he also advocates the more disciplined, risk-averse approaches for projects 
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Although today’s policy of evolutionary acquisition is prescribed as a 
development methodology, it is actually focused more upon what -- not how -- we 
develop. As such, it is about doable scope, reducing risk via exclusive use of mature 
technology.  The Cost As an Independent Variable and other requirement-limiting 
initiatives (i.e. elimination of MILSPECs) were earlier attempts to accomplish this, by 
encouraging product performance trades to keep cost estimates fixed. Like CAIV, 
this likely means trading performance requirements for earliest deploying 
increments. 
Conclusions 
It could be summarized that spiral development was at its inception and is at 
its extension all about risk. Paradoxically, it is an agile method envisioned to reduce 
risk, and yet can potentially add its own. On the one hand, a spiral or incremental 
approach allays risk by reducing scope to render only the highest priority capabilities 
with the exclusive use of mature technology, and obtains early and continuous 
feedback from the environment for follow-on developments. On the other hand, it 
introduces concurrency during advanced development and adds variety in 
production, with all their attendant management challenges.  
We’ve suggested that a one-size-fits-all methodology for DoD system 
development may not be appropriate, and have offered for consideration several 
product attributes that might help determine the applicability of the spiral approach. 
We speculate that spiral development may serve better than single step 
development for initial capability when products are mutable, time critical, non-
maintenance intensive, and have continuous (vs. binary) or uncertain requirements, 
short cycle times (less knock-on effects), sequentially phased development, and 
modular independence. In contrast, spiral development may not be appropriate 
when there are safety or man-rating concerns and have attributes opposite to those 
above.  In particular, program managers should understand the nature of their 
product requirements with regard to their range of attainment and relative to key 
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technologies. Some key features may indeed be binary, and others may have 
significant ramifications of partial attainment – such as propagated change across 
the entire product componentry (as in weight reduction), versus a more independent 
modular modification. 
Open design standards will not always be incorporable, and product variety 
will emerge, with and without backward compatibility, interoperability, etc. Variety is 
both an asset (for end users) and a liability (for manufacturers, owners and 
supporters). As such, to compensate for product variety risk, we posit that acquirers 
must “own” the design and emphasize configuration management, keeping or 
assigning responsibility for that function, and maintaining accountability for it. 
Our title – “from amorphous to defined” – alludes not only to product 
specification, but also to risk realization in spiral development. Spiral development 
has inherent challenges, both strategic and tactical, of which PMs must be aware. 
We’ve highlighted and illustrated them here, as well as showing that spiral 
development can indeed work – especially for technically mature and mutable 
products with open or elegant architecture. Program managers must be aware of 
these inherent risks, and take necessary precautions to balance them with tools that 
we have mentioned.  
Finally, stability is the quest in all things programmatic – for funding, 
requirements, design, production configuration, etc. But in an unstable world, and 
with the future being necessarily uncertain, the tension between control and change 
is probably unending. PMs do have some tools for coping, and being forewarned is 
being forearmed. PMs are used to concurrency and change, as they are largely what 
make project management what it is – a balancing act. Mechanisms for control of 
risk include many well-known project management tools. Organizational and cultural 
factors such as leadership, trust and accountability play a significant role as well. 
Successful use of these tools to balance control and risk in projects with a high rate 
of change and concurrency is an area for our further research, in order to improve 
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Introduction—The Inevitability of Change 
We are told in Diogenes Laertius's Lives and Opinions of Eminent 
Philosophers (early 3rd century) that the Greek philosopher Heraclitus (c.535 - 475 
BC) was the first to observe and say, “Everything flows; nothing stands still,”—the 
popular derivation of which is, “The only constant is change.”  Indeed, everything 
does seem to change, evolve and give rise to variety in the world.  Since his work in 
the 1830s, Charles Darwin receives much of the credit for furthering a theory of 
biological evolution.  While not the first to have the idea, he associated observations 
of species variety on the island of Galapagos with species environment, and 
suggested that nature selected the variations that were the fittest (Darwin, 1859). In 
its time (and even since), the idea was considered radical and a threat to the 
religious and social order of things. Mere variety itself can be controversial, since, 
paradoxically, variety is appreciated in some domains (Cowper, 1731-1800)1 and 
abhorred in others (Neave, 2000, March 2).2 At the core of the subject of 
evolutionary acquisition are ideas and phenomena about variety and change. As a 
policy for system development, it is controversial too. As with Darwinian concepts, 
product evolution involves information transfer, interaction with the environment and 
unpredictability of change outcomes. But unlike evolutionary biology, product 
variations and selections occur frequently and are non-random. Much of what the 
authors have found in their following research on spiral development and project 
management is about how managers must cope with product variety and change. 
Using case study analyses, review of current subject literature, and computational 
modeling, the focus of our research was to ascertain the acquisition management 
implications of spiral development, obtain lessons learned in past programs as 
                                            
1 See also: Kerr (1979, p. 65) about the basic human need for variety and complexity. Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety states that the internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as diverse as its 
environment in order to cope with the variety of challenges imposed by it (Ashby, 1960).  
2 “Variation is nasty: it makes things difficult, unpredictable, untrustworthy: bad quality.” “In a big way, 
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applicable to future development efforts, model and simulate projects using different 
acquisition approaches, derive predictions and make recommendations to project 
managers for the effective and efficient harnessing and implementation of spiral 
development. 
Projects have long been defined as unique and temporary enterprises, as 
opposed to common and ongoing operations. The latest (2004) version of the 
Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) increased its emphasis upon the 
term “progressive elaboration” to describe a third fundamental characteristic of all 
projects. It means, “developing in steps and continuing by increments; worked out 
with care and detail; developed thoroughly” (PMBOK, 2000; PMBOK, 2004, p. 6). 
This term relates to project uncertainty and describes the eventual realization of 
project scope only after multiple iterations of planning. The PMBOK asserts that 
progressive elaboration is both a necessary characteristic of projects (occurring 
throughout their lifecycles), as well as a technique for development of product 
specifications. It is accomplished via the learning that takes place over time as 
project ambiguity resolves, so that project scope becomes more explicit and detailed 
(as opposed to “requirements creep” which is considered uncontrolled change). The 
PMBOK later asserts that change in the course of projects and products is 
inevitable, and mandates the need for a disciplined change-control process to 
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New Terminology and a Mandate for Variety 
The Department of Defense has also put into effect new terminology in recent 
years pertaining to project management and product development methodologies, 
with often vague or subtle differences in meaning from older terms. Examples are: 
phased acquisition, agile acquisition, iterative design, rapid prototyping, pre-planned 
product improvement (P3I), product-improvement program (PIP), evolutionary 
acquisition, spiral development, incremental development/capability, planned 
upgrades, and modernization through spares. Others have used related expressions 
such as Rational Unified Process Framework, successive limited comparisons, and 
even “muddling through” (Sylvester & Ferrara, 2003)3 
In the year 2000, the Defense Department promulgated the term “evolutionary 
acquisition” (EA) in its policy documents governing the strategy for acquisition of 
materiel, and mandated such strategies as the preferred approaches (USD(AT&L), 
2000, October 23). Later elaborated as spiral and incremental strategies, these 
approaches contrast in principle to others that utilize more serial, sequential or 
singular efforts to arrive at a product solution (though not necessarily precluding the 
use of iterative planning/designing processes). They are often termed as: single-
step-to-full-capability, grand design, big bang, technological leap, waterfall, rational-
comprehensive, and the unified development method (Mooz, Forsberg, & 
Cotterman, 2005, p. 354).  The overarching goals and principles of the DoD’s 
evolutionary acquisition were explained as follows: 
To ensure that the Defense Acquisition System provides useful military 
capability to the operational user as rapidly as possible, evolutionary 
acquisition strategies shall be the preferred approach to satisfying operational 
                                            
3 Even social scientists have espoused the advantages of incremental progress in decision-making 
such as in Lindblom’s famous 1959 public administration classic, The science of muddling through: 
Lindblom, C. E. (1959). Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring), (Reprinted (1977). In F. A. Kramer 
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needs. Evolutionary acquisition strategies define, develop, and 
produce/deploy an initial, militarily useful capability ("Block I") based on 
proven technology, time-phased requirements, projected threat assessments, 
and demonstrated manufacturing capabilities, and plan for subsequent 
development and production/deployment of increments beyond the initial 
capability over time (Blocks II, III, and beyond). (USD(AT&L), 2000, October 
23; emphasis added)  











Figure 1. Incremental Capabilities (adapted from Lumb, 2004)  
The DoD later defined an “increment” the following way: 
An increment is a militarily useful and supportable operational capability that 
can be effectively developed, produced or acquired, deployed and sustained. 
Each increment of capability will have its own set of attributes and associated 
performance values with thresholds and objectives established by the 
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Initially, however, the DoD’s definitions of spiral development were imprecise, 
and were exceedingly so for the next two years.  “Spiral development” had been 
used since 1985 in the software community, coined by Dr. Barry W. Boehm, Chief 
Scientist of TRW’s Defense Systems Group (Boehm, 1985, pp. 22-42).  He also 
served from 1989-1992 as the DoD’s Director of the DARPA Information Science 
and Technology Office, and as Director of the DDR&E Software and Computer 
Technology Office. When “spiral development” was rolled out by the DoD in 2000, it 
was first described as a development process within product increments, for 
example: 
Spiral Development is an iterative process for developing a defined set of 
capabilities within one increment. Each increment will include multiple spirals. 
This provides interaction among user, tester, and developer throughout 
system development. In each spiral, requirements are refined and allocated to 
the design. Then coding, fabricating, and integration is accomplished, either 
physically or via modeling. The system or model is then tested and results 
assessed. The learning from this spiral is then applied to the next spiral. This 
process is repeated until we have fully developed a system concept, then a 
development baseline, and finally, a capability that meets warfighter needs. 
(AFIT, 2007; Hawthorne & Lush, 2002, August) 
Boehm’s earlier work had pointed out that not only could software developers 
demonstrate functionality in an incremental way, but management could also commit 
corporate resources in an incremental way.  But “rapid” and “evolution” are terms 
that don’t go effectively together. And confusion continued in the acquisition 
community throughout 2003—when definitions emerged in midyear and were 
published in the next revision of DoDI 5000.2 in an attempt to clarify the difference 
between spiral and incremental development as similar but different processes 
within an evolutionary acquisition strategy (Washington Technology):  
3.3.2. The approaches to achieve evolutionary acquisition require 
collaboration between the user, tester, and developer. They include:  
3.3.2.1. Spiral Development. In this process, a desired capability is 
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Those requirements are refined through demonstration and risk management; 
there is continuous user feedback; and each increment provides the user the 
best possible capability. The requirements for future increments depend on 
feedback from users and technology maturation. 
3.3.2.2. Incremental Development. In this process, a desired capability 
is identified, an end-state requirement is known, and that requirement is met 
over time by developing several increments, each dependent on available 
mature technology. (USD(AT&L), 2003b, May 12) 
Furthermore, of the two approaches to evolutionary acquisition strategy, spiral 
development was declared the preferred process for execution (USD(AT&L), 2003a, 
May 12). In 2003, the Congress sought to define these terms as well, perhaps so 
that completely new development efforts or programs could not be disguised as 
incremental spirals or product improvements. 
(g) Definitions.- In this section: “(1) The term ‘spiral development 
program’, with respect to a research and development program, means a 
program that - “(A) is conducted in discrete phases or blocks, each of which 
will result in the development of fieldable prototypes; and “(B) will not proceed 
into acquisition until specific performance parameters, including measurable 
exit criteria, have been met. (US Code, Title 10, 2002)  
For the acquisition workforce today, some confusion still persists with 
the DoD’s terminology, and certainly with the broader implications of the 
policy and its tactical implementation (Lorell, Lowell, & Younossi, 2006). To 
fully differentiate between old and new terminology and process criteria, the 
instructional and leadership arms of USD (AT&L) distributed the table below 
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Figure 2. Development Strategy Comparison Table 
As illustrated, what this all means in the simplest of terms is that we now have 
a mandate for all programs to have multiple product releases, some of which will 
have defined requirements while others are more amorphous. For the incremental 
development approach, this involves the deliberate deferral of work to a later project 
phase. Future adaptability is an inherent development objective for spiral and 
incremental approaches. However, if we look at programs over their extended 
lifecycles, it could be argued that many, if not all of them, have all been developed 
with (initially unplanned) continual spirals or increments of refreshment and 
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Reducing Cycle-time and a Move toward 
Evolutionary Requirements 
The policy for evolutionary acquisition strategy was aimed at improving all 
parameters of program success, but clearly and explicitly, its single most important 
objective was to reduce long product cycle-times to deliver operationally useful 
equipment. The attainment of agility or flexibility in what had been a very rigid 
requirements process was an implicit objective within the concept, but was 
nonetheless important from an implementation perspective. Commensurately, the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process was 
changing in parallel with the DoD 5000 series revisions and appeared in five 
different editions between August 1999 and May 2005. As one of its principal 
modifications, it prescribed a series of three evolving requirements documents to 
describe attainable capabilities from initial conception, through design, to production 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, May 11).4 
As previously mentioned, project management differs from operations 
management in that all projects are unique and exist for a limited amount of time, 
and with significant uncertainty. Uncertain events or conditions that can negatively 
affect project objectives operationally define risk (PMBOK, 2004, p. 5). Activity 
concurrency is a necessary aspect of projects for efficiency of execution, but only to 
the extent that the total scope is accomplishable. Otherwise, technical performance 
risks, as well as schedule and cost risks, emerge. Like others who operate in a 
strategic realm, project managers see themselves within an environment of volatility, 
uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Nevertheless, they are expected to predict 
project outcomes in terms of cost, schedule and performance. Project risk (typically 
schedule, budget and technical performance risk) is often viewed in terms of 
                                            
4 These requirements documents are the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Capability Development 
Document (CDD) and Capability Production Document (CPD), approved in support of Milestones A, 
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adequacy of available information about the project environment and the potential 
effects of management actions (Pich, Loch, & De Meyer, 2002, August 8).  Large 
defense systems are very complex, consisting of diverse hardware and software 
sub-systems, multiple suppliers, numerous interfaces, etc. Worse, the current 
environment of rapid technological change has become particularly problematic for 
such projects with long product cycles. Because of this “churn,” it is proving more 
and more difficult to fully define technical specifications—or even the complete set of 
system functional characteristics and operational capabilities—before commencing 
advanced development. Project uncertainty and risk seem to be increasing. 
Earlier (1990s-era), DoD acquisition reform initiatives took aim at such 
ambiguity and uncertainty and sought purposefully to reduce the product cycle by 
alleviating the information gap and technology lag via measures such as: alpha 
contracting, advanced concept technology demonstrations, pursuit of commercial-
off-the-shelf products, and Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD).5 
During this era, it was thought that insufficient involvement of numerous and diverse 
project stakeholders, particularly early in the program’s life, led to project changes 
later on that were more costly to implement. IPPD was adopted as a management 
process (Perry, 1995, May 10) to encourage cross-functional teamwork and promote 
collective wisdom.  Employment of IPPD was specifically to facilitate meeting cost 
and performance objectives, as well as to field products sooner, via the continuous 
collaboration within Integrated Product Teams (IPT). But in the main, it was about 
early and complete requirements capture 6 through collaboration.  
As concerns over DoD acquisition program costs and cycle-times continue in 
the current mid-2000s era, the DoD has not abandoned the use of IPPD.  But by 
                                            
5 Of 63 named 1990s-era acquisition reform initiatives, many sought to reduce bureaucracy, 
modernize and streamline processes, and reap a resultant reduction in overall cycle-time. However, 
these four as mentioned appear directly oriented against technology uncertainty and inadequate 
information. 
6 See Bruce, M. & Cooper, R. (2000). Creative product design. West Sussex, England: Wiley & Sons, 
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embracing evolutionary requirements and acquisition, it has acknowledged that 
information will never be complete, either from stakeholders or with regard to ever-
changing technology. It now implicitly concedes that developers will learn about their 
design over time (“requirements realization”), and users will accretively gain 
knowledge about how they can better use the new capability (“product discovery”).7 
Thus, a major paradigm shift for product development has occurred in the DoD: from 
a collaborative quest to capture and address all requirements early on, to an 
allowance of eventual requirements discovery with full attainment only after 
visualization, feedback and environmental changes occur along the way.  
                                            
7 The authors’ terminology for what has so often been observed from their experiences. Most of us 
have long known that full realization of requirements and visualization of the product often takes 
multiple iterations of design, with feedback loops from modeling and testing activities.  And 
sometimes the customer doesn’t fully realize what can be done with the product until it is in hand. We 
call that product discovery, and the authors can cite several examples of this in both commercial and 
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The Enabler: Mature Technology Reduces Risk  
This is not to say, however, that the DoD has in its policy embraced 
technological uncertainty for the commencement of advanced development. Quite 
the contrary—for at the very heart of the evolutionary acquisition strategy is the 
requirement for the exclusive use of mature technology to reduce project risk. The 
impetus for this undoubtedly lies in the body of work by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) over the last ten years,8 which has obviously and greatly 
influenced the DoD 5000 series. The GAO encourages the use of knowledge-based 
processes and specifically separates technology development from product 
development. It characterizes three knowledge points in the course of product 
development as:  
Knowledge Point 1 Matching of resources and needs (time, funding, 
technology, and requirements)—at the point of 
program initiation (corresponding to DoD’s Milestone 
B). 
Knowledge Point 2 Stable product design (typified by having 90% of 
component drawings complete)—midway through 
advanced development (DoD’s System Development 
and Demonstration Phase) at the point of system-
level critical design review (corresponding to the 
DoD’s Design Readiness Review). 
Knowledge Point 3 Mature production processes: proven products with all 
key manufacturing processes in statistical control and 
meeting cost, schedule, and quality targets. 
Described by the GAO as the start of production 
(corresponding to the DoD’s Milestone C—though 
some might argue that such knowledge is not 
completely realized until Full Rate Production9). 
                                            
8 See in particular: GAO/NSIAD-98-56; GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123; GAO/NSIAD-99-162; GAO/T-NSIAD-
99-116; GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137; GAO-01-288; GAO-02-701; GAO-03-57; GAO-04-53. 
9 Statement by US Army Colonel (Ret.) Mike Boudreau, former PM for the Family of Tactical Wheeled 
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The GAO has claimed that genuine assessments of program knowledge 
acquired at these control points will reveal whether the programs and their requisite 
investments should proceed or be halted. They argue that shorter product cycle-
times are the hallmark of program success and, therefore, should be limited to five 
years for more frequent introduction of new technologies into weapon systems, 
speeding them to the warfighter. We note that this is not much longer than the 
average development time for a new model of automobile—typically 3-4 years—
which occurs in a very mature and cyclical industry (Kim, 2002, June). This target 
may ignore the significantly greater amount of technology development required in 
many DoD projects compared with most automobile development projects.  
Most emphasized by the GAO (in the many reports reviewed by these 
authors) is the aspect of technology maturity before commencement of advanced 
development. The Office applies a 1-through-9 rating scale of technology readiness 
levels (TRL) that was developed by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, adopted by Army and Air Force research laboratories, and recently 
implemented in the DoD 5000 series (in particular, the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook—formerly DoD 5000.2R). Until recently, the DoD had no specific 
requirements for use of TRLs, but levels 6 and 7 now satisfy its guidelines for 
technology maturity at Milestone B. TRL 6 states that the technology has been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment (simulating the key aspects of the 
operational environment), and TRL 7 is its demonstration in an operational 
environment (that which addresses all operational requirements and specifications 
required of the final system, to include platform/packaging). The GAO clearly prefers 
TRL 7 as the level of technology maturity that will represent a low and satisfactory 
risk for starting product development (GAO, 2005, November 15). The Office 
acknowledges that users may not initially receive the ultimate capability under this 
approach, but that the initial capability will arrive predictably sooner and cheaper 
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Figure 3. DoD Technology Readiness Levels (GAO, 1999, July 30) 
In some respects, developing only mature technology as a fundamental 
program requirement is similar to an earlier attempt to constrain project scope. Cost 
As an Independent Variable (CAIV) was an acquisition reform initiative that emerged 
in 1995 as a means of trading scope, or system performance, to achieve cost 
objectives. It was one of very few initiatives that were oriented on what, not how (i.e., 
processes) the DoD acquires its materiel.10 To date, its actual savings benefit has 
been difficult to quantify, and qualitative measures have shown mixed results 
                                            
10 Some may also assert that the moratorium against MILSPECS was similar in its thrust to reduce 
unnecessary scope of work, but we believe many specifications to be as much prescriptive (i.e., 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 16 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
(RAND, MG291, 2005). The practice of using requirement attainment objectives and 
thresholds was another way to facilitate performance trades for cost. 
When fully realized, it is the exclusive use of mature technology in system 
development programs that is the key enabler of evolutionary acquisition strategy, 
facilitating the rapid transformation of applied technology to end-item capability. 
Thus, it is the third of three principal observations, all of which are paradigm shifts, 
that we have recently observed: (1) that the DoD would now mandate program 
strategies for all programs to have multiple product releases of the same item, (2) 
that requirements would be deferred or allowed to evolve over time, and (3) that high 
levels of technological maturity would be requisite for commencement of advanced 
development, with an intended reduction of technical risk (and thus, project 
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Policy Concerns 
But there are questions and concerns about these major shifts that several 
authors have raised. While still a relatively new policy, observations and realizations 
about the outcomes of evolutionary acquisition and spiral development are only just 
beginning to emerge, until at least several major programs go through their entire 
lifecycle in this way. One of the first histories and analytical descriptions of 
evolutionary acquisition policy formulation came from Sylvester and Ferrara, in their 
2003 discourse on Conflict and Ambiguity Implementing Evolutionary Acquisition 
(Sylvester & Ferrera, 2003). This piece gave some insight into the challenges and 
obstacles of evolutionary acquisition implementation—not from program office 
level—but from the perspective of strategic policy makers and subscribers at the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level, during their struggle to adopt the 
policy. In short, the authors explained the aforementioned confusion and ambiguity 
of the policy as it evolved from 1983 toward final promulgation in 2000, and then 
described the conflict areas caused by shifts in power among the organizational 
fiefdoms in the OSD and other affected institutions (i.e., Congress and the defense 
industry). In particular, they exposed the following major stakeholder communities 
and their respective areas of concern about evolutionary acquisition: 
Congress loss of control over DoD programs via specific and 
informed authorization and approval; the inability 
to keep the DoD accountable; unknown 
implications of requirements and budget flexibility 
required for evolutionary acquisition. 
Military Departments need to protect own acquisition programs and 
share of the DoD budget; retention of funding for 
follow-on capability increments; increased 
oversight; downstream logistics of multi-
configuration products. 
Defense Industry disruptions to commercial processes and 
traditional approaches to business; competition for 
follow-on increments; lower-rate production runs 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 18 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Comptroller controlling programs and holding them 
accountable; unknown implications of 
requirements and budget flexibility required for EA 
(program and budget “gaming” by services); “full 
funding” policy11 versus open-ended requirements 
and fund streams. 
Requirements/Users sub-optimum capability; priority of what is needed 
versus what is currently attainable; loss of follow-
on increments.  
Test and Evaluation loss of discipline and assurance of operational 
effectiveness & suitability; lack of comprehensive 
testing before several low-rate production 
configurations are released. 
Sylvester and Ferrara’s list of these policy concerns was not meant to be all-
inclusive, nor does it take into account other communities, like program managers 
and logisticians, who also have issues about evolutionary acquisition 
implementation. But their essay about strategic conflicts within the emergent policy 
does provide valuable insight into some of the challenges of effective tactical 
implementation. 
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Implementation Concerns 
The authors of this discussion have also been attentive during the policy’s 
turbulent progression. As researchers and former practitioners, we’ve had our own 
concerns about spiral development from both strategic as well as tactical 
standpoints, and with regard for its efficiency and effectiveness in application:  
• We previously noted the significant increase in OSD-level program 
decision reviews under the new acquisition framework (Dillard, 2005), 
and suggested such additional centralization of control might work 
counter to the stated policy’s innovation-fostering goals. Reviews serve 
as control gates where decision makers can stop, extend or grant 
permission for projects to proceed into the next phase.  Program 
reviews, major-milestone or otherwise, at the OSD level have a 
significant impact on program offices as off-core activities.  Much 
documentation must be prepared and many preparatory meetings are 
conducted enroute to the ultimate review.  And while non-milestone 
reviews are generally considered to require less preparation effort, a 
considerable amount of effort managing the decision process is still 
expended. The latest DoDI 5000.2 prescribes that, “In an evolutionary 
acquisition program, the development of each increment shall begin 
with a Milestone B, and production resulting from that increment shall 
begin with a Milestone C” (USD(AT&L), 2003b).  Thus, program 
managers can expect to undergo the reviews determined appropriate 
for the initial increment of development in their program, as well as 
reviews specified for all of the follow-on increments. And our concern 
follows that the added time and effort expended on such control 
activities and added transaction costs might actually delay the arrival of 
capability (Franck, Melese, & Dillard, 2006) (see Figure 4).  
• There will likely be significant organizational impacts of concurrent 
development and production within program management offices. Of 
concern is that the first increment’s operational testing and production 
effort may now run parallel to the follow-on development effort for the 
next increment, presenting additional management challenges to the 
program manager. If designers are truly freed from development of the 
initial increment, they can be gainfully employed in the successive 
effort. But, if system components need to be re-worked as a result of 
incomplete realization of requirements or incomplete implementation of 
the technology in the first increment, there will be organizational stress 
and division of effort from the added concurrency. In either case, there 
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employed in the organization as it is executing production and 
development at the same time. It would indeed be an unfortunate 
consequence to have two increments to achieve one set of capabilities 
take longer and cost more than it would have in a project structured to 
just one increment (Dillard, 2005) (see Figure 4). It is these 
phenomena that we have modeled with computational organizational 
design tools, which will be discussed later. 
Technology 
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Figure 4. Comparison of 1996 and 2003 Acquisition Framework Models 
• The GAO compiled a large body of convincing evidence that 
technology maturation efforts during advanced development have 
lengthened programs, with a resultant delay in capability arrival and 
substantial cost growth. Under the new framework, Milestone B is the 
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technology) development.12 But, given the hypothetical arrival of 
technology maturity at some given point in time, it can be argued that 
the delay of program initiation until “the technology is demonstrated in 
a relevant environment”13 can only come from more time spent in the 
preceding phases of Concept Refinement and Technology 
Development. Unless SDD (advanced development) is greatly 
shortened indeed, this could make less certain the potential of any real 
program cycle-time reduction, or worse—could increase the likelihood 
of obsolete product technology (or simply non-competitive state-of-the-








                                            
12 DoD policy greatly reflects the influence of the GAO Reports recommending increased product 
knowledge prior to business commitment. See GAO. (2002). Best practices—Capturing design and 
manufacturing knowledge early improves acquisition outcomes. 02-701. and GAO. (1999, July). 
Better management of technology development can improve weapon system outcomes. NSIAD-99-
162. 
13 Which relates to Technology Readiness Level 6—Now in statute: amended in 2006, Title 10, 
United States Code Chapter 139 Sec. 2366a. Major defense acquisition programs: certification 
required before Milestone B or Key Decision Point B approval`(a) Certification—A major defense 
acquisition program may not receive Milestone B approval, or Key Decision Point B approval in the 
case of a space program, until the milestone decision authority certifies that—`(1) the technology in 
the program has been demonstrated in a relevant environment. 
14 Some seasoned program managers interviewed have seen technology languish in the laboratories, 
sometimes never transferring to system application—the fear being now that too much time will be 
spent in technology development with ineffectual efforts to “pull” from the technology base, versus 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 22 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Figure 5. Lengths of Development Phases Relative to Technology and 
Capability Arrival  
 
• The long held term, “full funding,” pertaining to the total cost associated 
with an authorized quantity of militarily usable end-items for 
procurement within the fiscal year, was recently given an added 
meaning. Current DoD policy requires full funding for programs at 
Milestone B. In this sense, full funding also means having an approved 
current (and projected) resource stream with which to execute the 
program; i.e., program funding is included both in the budget and in the 
out-years of the FYDP sufficient to cover the current and future efforts 
described in the acquisition strategy (DAU, 2001). Expansion of the 
term was to ensure that programs would be less likely to exceed 
program estimates if they were not initiated until all forecasted 
resources were in place (USD(AT&L), 2003b).15 However, evolutionary 
acquisition allows for one of two development processes to be 
implemented: (a) Incremental Development—in which end-state 
requirements are known, and will be met over time in several 
increments, and (b) Spiral Development—in which desired capability is 
                                            
15 DoDI 5000.2 states that: “Transition into SDD requires full funding (i.e., inclusion of the dollars and 
manpower needed for all current and future efforts to carry out the acquisition strategy in the budget 
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identified, but end-state requirements are not known at program 
initiation, and requirements for future increments are dependent upon 
technology maturation and user feedback from initial increments. A 
special challenge is presented for obtaining realistic full-funding 
estimates for programs with uncertain requirements and numbers of 
increments.  Unplanned work is inestimable. Likewise, timing the 
arrival of RDT&E or Production funding via the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process for 
unanticipated discoveries that might suddenly emerge is an additional 
challenge for this calendar-driven and lethargic decision-support 
system. Much depends here upon the relatively successive or 
concurrent phasing of the follow-on increments. Where increments are 
defined, other financial and political aspects may also come into play, 
such as maintaining the priority of funding for the successive 
increments. (Since all programs compete for funding within the DoD 
budgeting process, division of programs into discrete increments would 
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The Costs and Benefits of Variety 
Evolutionary acquisition methodologies, in addition to potentially adding more 
concurrency during development, increase variety in production. Variety can be both 
a liability and an asset. Much has already been written about the obvious logistical 
challenges and ownership costs that can arise from having multiple configurations of 
deployed hardware end-items (Apte, 2005, June 30). Use of standardized or 
common components requires fewer inventories and a resultant cost savings, 
depending upon the need for maintenance and spares support (Ravindran, Phillips, 
& Solberg, 1987, p. 329). RAND’s study of support considerations for the current 
mixed configuration fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) said, “Multiple aircraft 
configurations drive multiple spare component packages and, in the most extreme 
cases, may drive multiple pieces of test equipment, all significantly increasing long-
term support costs” (Shaver, Lynch, Amouzegar, & Snyder, 2005; emphasis added). 
And changing production configurations is not viewed as efficient—due to 
supportability issues (regarding spares and maintenance) with lot, model, and type 
diversity. Reliability issues can also emerge because of insufficient testing of the 
changes. Depending on the degree of change, system validation and qualification 
become a concern if changes are not under strict control. And there may be 
backward compatibility and interoperability issues as well. Another burden is the 
training impact of mixed capabilities within the force or even within the same owning 
and operating unit.  
In production—and for hardware in particular—a stable design is often the 
quest: to reduce unwanted variation and the potential for detrimental and unintended 
consequences. It is not that change or variety itself is deleterious, but we fear the 
penalties of unwanted change. Also, many project managers have long been taught 
to seek total requirements realization up front via rigorous IPPD and Systems 
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the design of a product later in its life (at least in the sense of performance 


































Figure 6. A Concept of the Relative Cost of Design Changes over Time 
Still, design changes often seem to abound once a product is in production— 
where efficiencies can be discovered via learning-curve effects, and minor 
engineering changes can be applied for value. Continuous Production Verification 
Testing (PVT), and even Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E), is 
conducted as deemed necessary to re-prove the system and allay the risks of 
unintended change propagation. Then may come the question of whether or not to 
retrofit previously manufactured items (to level the capabilities across the item 
population), and to what extent the items to be modified will become similar to the 
newer items produced. 
Aside from ownership, the risks and costs of variety also come into play at the 
manufacturer’s facility, with product-design changes cascading through 
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recently, it has come to light that Airbus’s 380 aircraft has been delayed for two 
years, costing perhaps $6 billion in profits, because of incompatibility between 
versions 4 and 5 of Dassault’s same Catia computer-aided design (CAD) software 
(Duvall & Bartholomew, 2007). Production variety generates such expenses as: the 
maintenance of configuration documentation, testing, risk analysis, spares inventory, 
supply chain, and tooling. The new Ford Motor Company Chief Executive Officer, 
Alan R. Mulally, dramatically cut costs at his former job as president and chief 
executive officer of Boeing Commercial Airplanes by reducing the number of aircraft 
models from fourteen to four, and now purportedly plans to reduce Ford’s eight 
brands as well (Langley, 2006, December).  Variety equates to complexity for 
management, and it comes with a cost (as well as potential benefits for customers).  
However, free markets appreciate variety in products and services. One MIT 
researcher asserts: 
Complexity is not an inherently bad property to us. Rather it is the coin of the 
realm in systems. You usually have to expend complexity dollars to achieve 
useful goals, such as increased functionality, efficiency or flexibility. (Moses, 
2000)  
Marketplace merchandisers provide variety for consumers who, on the whole, 
demand selection (points of product differentiation), and wish to benefit from the 
economic behaviors of competition. A mix of products is more likely to satisfy both 
mainstream and smaller niche needs. Most often, market needs and annual 
business cycles for revenue drive commercial decisions about time to product 
delivery—such as seen with the annual cycle of toys or automobiles. Commercial 
firms, then, are accustomed to making decisions about “doable scope” and are 
willing to defer offering product features that are less attainable (more risky) for the 
coming year’s introduction to the market. But competitive threats against a new 
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It is along this vein that we take issue with some examples used by the GAO 
to provide rationale for DoD employment of evolutionary acquisition. Over the last 
decade, they have used products such as Maytag washing machines, commercial 
automobiles (the Jaguar, Lincoln Navigator, and Plymouth Prowler), commercial 
aircraft (Boeing 737 and 777) and commercial shipping (Polar Tanker), etc., as 
exemplars to make the case for a array of practices that the DoD should employ—
such as design trades for reliability and reduced operating costs, use of mature 
technology, and evolutionary acquisition.16 For the most part, we regard these 
commercial products as relatively “low-tech” on a comparative scale of DoD system 
complexity and capability. But more importantly, the GAO ignores product variety 
from the vantage point of owner versus that of the producer.  The DoD is quite 
unique in that it almost entirely outsources capital projects for exclusively internal 
use. Companies such as Boeing and Jaguar and Maytag do the opposite—they 
conduct internal projects for external users. The concept is an important one, we 
feel, because of the implications of ownership—especially with regard to product 
variety. And if the extremes of combat environments are added for consideration and 
comparison of such products, it becomes clear that the risks of added complexity 
increase gravely. 
A more representative commercial archetype, if there really were one, would 
be a product such as those within the United Parcel Service’s truck fleet—a product 
created specifically for the internal use of UPS and to its unique specifications.17 With 
a fleet of now 80,000 diesel-powered vehicles, delivering some 13 million packages 
per day, UPS has continuously (since 1935) explored the potential of alternative 
fuels for reduction in pollutants and fuel economy. Its latest excursion was in 1996, 
to introduce a truck using Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) manufactured by 
                                            
16 see GAO Reports 99-162, 03-57, and 98-56. 
17 Indeed, the GAO did reference the FedEx truck fleet in one of the above reports with regard to 
design trades for reliability and lower ownership costs, but not for the introduction of product variety 
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Freightliner Custom Chassis and Cummins Engine Company. The vehicles were 
built in 1996 and tested from 1997 to 2001 with a limited deployment of 101 vehicles, 
and confined to a small geographical area—Hartford, CT. The CNG trucks had 75% 
lower emissions for carbon monoxide, 49% lower oxides of nitrogen, and 95% lower 
particulate matter than the diesel trucks of similar age. But the energy-equivalent 
fuel economy of the CNG trucks was 27% to 29% lower than that of the diesel 
trucks, and the maintenance costs were 29% higher. Citing larger infrastructural 
issues, the UPS CNG Report cited lack of publicly accessible CNG refueling stations 
as a nationwide issue that deters the further deployment of such vehicles, and 
suggested that more economic incentives (tax credits and exemptions, fuel 
discounts, etc.) were needed (Dept. of Energy, 2002, August). With only 1% of its 
truck fleet now using alternative fuels, UPS has no current plans to procure more 
CNG fleet vehicles, but continues to watch the development and economics of new 
alternative fuels technology. This short example only serves to point out that unique 
users of unique equipment have unique ownership and support requirements; and 
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Do Product Attributes Affect Spiral Applicability 
and Outcomes? 
Spiral development as a universal, “one-size-fits all” strategy may not always 
be appropriate. In addition to strategic and tactical implications about spiral 
development that we have already mentioned, more operational questions have 
surfaced of late: such as, whether certain product characteristics might encourage or 
discourage the use of this development approach. As already described, spiral 
development was conceived for alleviation of software risk from ill-defined solutions 
and uncertain requirements. From the literature and cases we’ve examined, we offer 
other product attributes below for program managers’ careful consideration when 
planning product capability increments. 
Mutability 
We question whether products with different attributes (e.g., hardware vs. 
software, buildings vs. electronics) may lend themselves more or less to the use of a 
spiral development approach. Perhaps the foremost reservation is the 
appropriateness of the spiral development process for all project sizes and product 
commodities in toto, and the application of the spiral process to hardware products 
versus Boehm’s original and most relevant application of this development approach 
toward software.18 It would also seem appropriate that some regard be given to the 
second- and third-order effects of evolutionary acquisition, like: training, 
supportability, failure causality, mixed-unit capability, funding decrements, decision 
reviews, organizational impacts of concurrent development and production efforts, 
etc., before its general application. Our research was in part to ascertain some of the 
product/project parameters that make sense for spiral development. Boehm himself 
                                            
18 And the authors will be quick to acknowledge that software is indeed a huge and growing part of 
hardware systems large and small. Still, the spiral development framework in current literature applies 
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warned of “hazardously distinct” spiral model imitations, and in his own words 
described his vision of the spiral process:   
The spiral development model is a risk-driven process model generator. It 
is used to guide multi-stakeholder concurrent engineering of software 
intensive systems. It has two main distinguishing features. One is a cyclic 
approach for incrementally growing a system's degree of definition and 
implementation while decreasing its degree of risk. The other is a set of 
anchor point milestones for ensuring stakeholder commitment to feasible 
and mutually satisfactory system solutions. (Boehm & Hansen, 2000, 
February 9. emphasis added) 
Clearly, the conceiver of this spiral notion was oriented upon amorphous 
requirements and continuous stakeholder inputs for the alleviation of project risk with 
a very mutable product (Reed, 2006, December 16). The nature of software being in 
the digital rather than physical realm, it is particularly conducive to rapid and 
successive revision and nearly costless production. And even Boehm encourages 
varying from the spiral model as needed and reverting to a sequential model if 
requirements are well established and the project less risky. 
Multiple product increments do not often appear in large, static, singular 
projects such as bridges, highways, office buildings, or in other project areas that 
have typically long lead times or product cycles, such as feature-length films, 
pharmaceuticals, etc. These are what we call nearly immutable products and are 
much different than smaller projects (like small application software development) 
with much shorter development periods. However, as with almost everything 
engineered that we can observe in the physical world, even these things can evolve 
and change with additions, spin-offs, sequels (and prequels), expansions, etc. 
Expansion of the long-standing San Francisco Bay Bridge and the now well-known 
Pentagon Renovation Program (enduring the attacks of September 11th, 2001) are 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 33 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 7. CALTRANS San Francisco Bay Bridge Expansion Project 
Cycle-time and Phase Concurrency 
Akin to relatively mutable or immutable products, we have observed the successive 
product upgrades visible in long-running aircraft programs (See UH-60 Blackhawk 
and C-130 Hercules chronologies in Appendix A and B respectively) in which there 
are periods of production configuration stability, followed by improvement efforts, 
followed by another stable use period. Cycle-time for the development of each 
increment, and the relatively successive or concurrent phasing of the follow-on 
increments, will have a definite impact on program structure, budgeting, project 
complexity, and organizational issues, etc. For reasons that we will bring forth in our 
section on the computational modeling of spiral development, we have concerns 
about the conceptualization of spiral development programs with continuous and 
highly concurrent phasing of development increments, such as in the doctrinal 
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Figure 8. Example of Program Structure Showing Two Successive 
Development Increments (adapted from DAU, 2003, June) 
We suggest that, though concurrency is a necessary ingredient for efficient 
project management, it has also long been correlated with risk (due to 
interdependence of activities), and might vary significantly with the types of activities 
underway (See Figure 9)—the inference being that periods of stable production 
configuration between development increments reduce complexity in program 
structure and attendant risks. Similarly, shorter cycle-times have less opportunity for 
knock-on effects or secondary consequences.  
Particularly in matrix organization structures, as often the case with projects, 
there can be a tendency to staff multiple projects with a single specialist. The more 
projects a specialist supports, the less they are proportionately available to the 
projects due to “queuing inefficiencies.” Availability decreases because of the need 
for transition between projects (physical, mental, learning curve, etc.). The end result 
has sometimes been shown to be large delays in project completion (Smith & 
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enterprise membership is a contributing factor toward knowledge loss in 
organizations involved in large complex product development processes. Examining 
knowledge flows across product life cycles, members often are not engaged in all 
phases. Whether from rotation of duties or multi-tasking, a discontinuous member’s 
inaccurate knowledge could cause a functional error at the individual level, which is 
not obvious at the enterprise’s overall project level. Her findings support 
observations of knowledge loss continuing despite investments in information 
technology and knowledge management.  
 
Figure 9. Concurrency Relative to Types of Activity 
User Risk (Safety and Time Criticality) 
Time-critical or Enhanced Survivability Systems 
We have discussed above the area of technological risk and the DoD’s use of 
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advanced development of only relatively mature technology). But DoD products 
have expanded risk considerations beyond Boehm’s models of commercial software. 
Extending the idea of project risk-as-a-driver down to the level of the end-user, it 
might seem logical to assume that time criticality of the need or mission, where risk 
of not achieving project success actually endangers customer lives, might be a 
significant factor in the appropriate application of the spiral process for reduced initial 
product cycle-time. Perhaps defensive systems are a good example. The immediate 
needs for a Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) defeater or an Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) neutralizer for currently deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, for 
example, clearly dictate that lives will be lost if a near-term capability is not achieved. 
We also cite as an example the National Missile Defense (NMD) initiative, in which, 
in view of near-term threats, early deployment of even rudimentary capability has 
been deemed preferable to waiting for full capability. Such urgency likely precludes 
full and certain requirements specificity. 
Man-rated Systems 
In an almost opposite vein, non-man-rated systems, such as Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles or cave-exploring robots—capabilities in which operator lives are not 
at risk if the product fails—may also lend themselves readily to rapid innovation and 
risk-less experimentation cycles.  
However, user hazard levels for man-rated systems may be a different 
matter. Configuration variety adds technical complexity with sometimes 
unpredictable interactions. In such projects as pharmaceuticals, aviation, vehicular 
transportation, etc., producers mitigate safety risks with thorough analyses, 
documentation reviews, testing and other control and verification processes.  By 
their very nature—with lethal hazards for the end-user, and typically lengthy 
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Production Quantity 
Aside from software-versus-hardware mutability, requirements uncertainty, 
and time/life criticality, we questioned whether production quantity is an attribute that 
might also help determine whether a spiral approach is best. There seems to be a 
view, in addition to some risk factors mentioned above, that these might be driving 
factors for NASA’s acquisition strategy determination. In June of 2006, the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies’ Human Space Exploration Initiative and Defense 
Industrial Initiatives Group hosted a conference on Spiral Development, Real 
Options, and Other Development Methodologies. Its purpose was to explore these 
topics in an open workshop forum to gain programmatic and financial perspectives 
and search for tools to mitigate space-related technology development problems. 
These authors attended and made presentations about their previous acquisition 
research.  
One panelist was Dr. Robie Samanta Roy, Assistant Director for Space 
Aeronautics from the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (Roy, 
2006, June), who formerly had worked with the Congressional Budget Office 
reviewing the Aldridge Commission (also known as The President’s Commission on 
Moon, Mars, and Beyond) on how to implement the human space exploration vision 
laid out by President George W. Bush in January 2004. In his statements at the 
conference, he described spiral development as a “go-as-you-can-pay strategy,” 
alluding to fiscal constraints and the incremental commitment of funds at decision 
points facilitated by the approach. However, for the development of the new Crew 
Exploration Vehicle (CEV), he suggested NASA was taking a different stance, 
perhaps because of no mass-production of such systems and the “front-loaded 
technology maturation” efforts peculiar to space systems acquisition. He stressed 
the need for clearly defined requirements for development of only a “handful” of 
space exploration vehicles and for primary focus to be upon an architecture.  
Another panelist, Mr. Chris Scolese, NASA’s Chief Engineer said regarding 
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anything,” (implying that long production runs encourage the application of a spiral 
approach). Tacitly rejecting the spiral approach, he stressed the risk aspect of NASA 
missions in terms of project costs and human life (e.g., earth orbit versus deep 
space) and framed the use of real options as “trading risk, not ROI (return on 
investment), for value.” Agreeing with Robie Samanta Roy, he said that the spiral 
process “will still be there” as NASA systems are “software intensive.” But he also 
said, “No two identical spacecraft are the same,” which seemed to contradict his 
idea that like configurations are a necessity among small production lot sizes.  
Indeed, naval shipbuilders say the same thing about variation among 
individual ships, or within flights, of the same class. And even one-of-a-kind nearly 
immutable projects like skyscrapers and bridges can be later re-modeled and 
refitted, as we mentioned above.19 It may instead be that NASA feels itself within a 
financially constrained budget environment and with a limited time window to 
execute its exploration missions. And, along with man-rating requirements, NASA 
may wish to limit its product scope and variety for these very pragmatic reasons. 
That might also account for NASA’s viewpoints differing from the observations by 
RAND (below), which also highlighted the front-loaded technology maturation efforts 
and small procurement numbers of space programs as different from other DoD 
systems, but still applicable for evolutionary acquisition (Lorell, Lowell, & Younossi, 
2006). And in RAND’s context, the “space programs” were all satellites—none 
carrying human life as payload.  
Thus, there seems to be an at least perceived aversion to spiral development 
of (user) life-threatening products such as manned space vehicles (and perhaps 
pharmaceutical drugs, aircraft, etc.), systems in which long product cycles and much 
bureaucratic control are often observed as measures to control risk (Dillard, 2005). 
Aside from truly singular efforts, we have not yet found any universal evidence of the 
                                            
19 Feature-length movies can have sequels and pharmaceuticals can have spin-offs, but they are for 
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spiral approach being more or less applicable according to quantity of systems 
produced. 
Logistical Support during Service/Shelf Life 
Our observations warn that multiple configurations of hardware products do 
come at a cost for ownership. Veterans of new system deployments across the 
force/fleet, or throughout any large using organization, know the difficulties of rolling 
out a configuration change. Benefits of standardization have long been offered via 
production economies of scale, commonality of parts across platforms, and 
interoperability. If the ultimate goal is to have standardization across the DoD’s 
force, owning multiple configurations of a system (variety) equates to added 
complexity in training and supply support of the item. Neither can the logistical 
maintenance strategy be ignored: whether the end-item is maintenance-intensive 
(such as tactical vehicles) or maintenance-free—such as with many electronics 
items and munitions, and situations in which physical changes are completely 
transparent to the user. For multiple product configurations, the answer could have a 
huge effect on the total costs of ownership, as previously mentioned by RAND in 
regard to UAVs.  
Range of Requirement Attainment 
Most requirements are “continuous,” i.e., may be satisfied in varying amounts 
of attainment. Thus, ranges of their satisfaction can be flexibly specified, allowing for 
thresholds (minimum values of attainment) and objectives (optimal values of 
attainment). Examples are range, accuracy, weight, reliability, etc. However, we 
have found that some requirements, often critical ones, are more binary in nature 
than continuous. They have a much narrower range of attainment, such that they are 
almost pass/fail or go/no-go in their demonstration. Examples are soft launch, 
network security, physical fit, leak-proof, shock/vibration/drop proof, survivability, 
horizontal-to-vertical flight transition, etc. If one of these more binary-type 
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the project’s critical path and highly dependent upon technical maturity. As such, it 
may practically dictate the length of the entire advanced development effort and 
make division into capability increments less beneficial as a development strategy. 
Such was the case of Javelin’s “soft launch” requirement, described in the case 
below, where attainment was dependent upon precise timing of ignition and dual-
motor burn, facilitated by electronic fusing and solid rocket motor-propulsion 
technologies. Though strongly correlated with product reliability, these kinds of 
requirements demand a system that “either works or it doesn’t”—without flexibility. 
Amount of Change—and the Lure of Modularity 
These authors subscribe to the current theorists’ view that system complexity 
is comprised of numbers (of components), connections (interdependencies) and 
distinctions (variety). Distinction corresponds to variety, to heterogeneity, and to the 
fact that different parts of complex systems behave differently (Heylighen, 1997). 
Variety is a component of Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon’s explanation of 
complexity—many different parts with many interactions. Simon argues, from his 
observation of complexity in things both natural and artificial, that complex systems 
evolve from simple systems. And they do so more rapidly when there are stable, 
intermediate forms or sub-systems (like modules or “units of action”) (Simon, 1981).  
Moreover, he argues the resulting evolution into the complex system will be 
hierarchical. In "The Architecture of Complexity," Simon proposed hierarchy as a 
universal principle of complex structures. He felt that complex problems could be 
solved more easily when decomposed into sub-problems (much as how we employ 
Work Breakdown Structures (WBS) via the Systems Engineering Process (SEP)).  
And sub-problem solutions could be combined into a solution to larger problems, etc. 
His famous “parable of the watchmakers” illustrated his hierarchical architecture 
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components (Simon, 1962).20 Commonly seen today are modular industrial products 
that are sometimes designed as complete architectures, with standardized interfaces 
that invite others to introduce complementary products for insertion (Agre, 2003). 
The Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) is a relatively new DoD initiative that 
encourages the use of widely supported commercial interface standards and 
disciplined interface controls to develop systems architectures using modular design 
concepts (DoD Open Systems Joint Task Force, 2003, August). But despite 
attempts over the last two decades to “architect” the command, control and 
computers (C3) domain with initiatives (such as compulsory use of Ada as a high-
order software language and imposition of a Joint Technical Architecture (JTA)) as 
ways of achieving interoperability, a plethora of incompatible “stovepipe” solutions 
nevertheless continue to proliferate in an almost chaotic evolution (Greene, 2007, 
March 1). This may be in large part because of the continuing realities of different 
services or communities with differing concepts of operations (CONOPS) driving 
different system requirements with different funding streams and different timelines. 
As in biological evolution, improved “fitness” with a system’s environment is 
what is sought in the adapting or evolving of systems. But others have noted that 
Simon’s metaphors for dynamic complex systems, useful as they are for 
understanding complexity, fall short of explaining their evolution. While the concept 
of modularity suggests approximately independent subsystems may be modified or 
adapted as such, it has been shown that, in the aggregate, there is yet quantifiable 
                                            
20 In his imaginary story, watchmakers named Hora and Tempus were highly skilled watch builders. 
But Hora prospered more than Tempus because of differences in their watch designs. While each 
maker’s design was comprised of 1000 elementary components, Tempus's watches weren’t 
hierarchical, and were assembled one part at a time. But Hora's watches were organized into 
hierarchical subassemblies of ten parts each. He could combine ten of these subassemblies into 
larger subassemblies, and then ten of these, until a complete watch was formed. The difference in the 
two watchmakers’ designs was evidenced when customers interrupted them throughout the day. 
When this occurred, they would put down their work and their uncompleted watches would fall apart. 
These interruptions didn’t disturb Hora, who lost at most ten units of work for whatever subassembly 
he was working on. Tempus, however, would typically lose much more, as he had to start all over 
with individual parts versus modules. Simon illustrated that that Hora could complete many more 
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modular interdependency that affects evolvability (Watson & Pollack, 2005). In other 
words, how changes in the state of one module affect the state of another is relative 
and measurable. Simon’s watchmaker parable illustrates that modularity is beneficial 
for production, but not necessarily for evolution. Examples of modular 
interdependency are plentiful. In the aircraft or automotive realm, an engine upgrade 
would seem intuitively to be a relatively independent subsystem change. But 
systems engineers know that changes propagate through hardware almost as much 
as software in the long run—just as the eventual rise in building temperature from 
the thermostat adjustment in one modular room.21 Adding increased armor protection 
(and weight) for deployed High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles has 
resulted in increased wear-out of drive train and suspension components and 
impacts to vehicle range, mobility, mileage, etc.—so that “up armor” kits have 
become only a stopgap measure until totally re-designed systems can be produced. 
Similarly, the 2006 engine upgrade of the CH-47F helicopter is more of a total 
system refresh: “95 percent is a new airplane,” according to Boeing Defense 
Systems, despite exterior appearances.  
Thus, we suggest it is not only the focus upon structural modularity as such, 
and standard interfaces, that enable systems evolution. Rather, it is the relative 
interdependency of the modules. In short, PMs need to be mindful of the degree of 
change in subsequent increments/spirals. One subsystem is likely to affect another 
in the short- or long-run. And that can make product evolution problematic. As 
Norman Augustine once said, “No change is a small change”; independent 
subsystems, even redundant ones, aren’t always independent (Augustine, 1997, 
June). 
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The RAND Study of Evolutionary Acquisition in DoD 
Space Programs 
In our literature review for this research effort, the authors examined the 2006 
RAND Corporation report under its Project Air Force series entitled, Evolutionary 
Acquisition—Implementation Challenges for Defense Space Programs, by Mark A. 
Lorell, Julia F. Lowell and Obaid Younossi. Their research principally addressed 
DoD space programs and focused primarily on program costs and the cost-
estimating implications of evolutionary acquisition strategy.  Their methodology 
consisted of literature review, interviews and five case studies. The program cases 
were: 
 Space-based Space Surveillance (SBSS) System 
 Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and Reporting System 
(RAIDRS) 
 Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) III 
 Space-Based Radar (SBR) 
 Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) 
RAND cautioned that these programs were all in their very earliest stages and 
that lessons derived from them must be considered tentative. We noted earlier that 
these were all non-man-rated systems. 
In their research, RAND’s objectives were similar to ours: seeking to ascertain 
programmatic implications, lessons already learned in recent space programs, and 
methods to adopt for effective implementation of evolutionary acquisition. They were 
careful to distinguish DoD space programs as different from other acquisition 
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1. They are characterized by very small procurement numbers of end-
items (space vehicles)—typically 1 - 25 satellites (with 6 being 
average), compared to much larger procurement numbers for products 
such as tactical aircraft or smart munitions. 
2. Space vehicle component testing cannot be done in a true operational 
environment (space) because of the high cost of space launches and 
the limited number of operational space vehicles in any system. 
3. A larger percentage of total program expenditures take place in the 
early phases of a space acquisition program in contrast to other 
acquisition programs. 
4. Space program technology development extends longer into the 
procurement process than is typical for other types of programs and 
has been formalized in the National Security Space Acquisition Policy 
03-01 (NSSAP 03-01) regulations. (Lorell, Lowell, & Younossi, 2006) 
Their acquisition management findings were: 
1. “The new DoD guidance regarding evolutionary acquisition (DoD 
5000 series and NSSAP 03-01) permits great flexibility, but does not 
eliminate conceptual and definitional ambiguity. As a result, 
evolutionary acquisition programs vary considerably in their practical 
implementation approaches” (Lorell, Lowell, & Younossi, 2006). 
Program Managers that RAND interviewed perceived having more 
flexibility to tailor their program structure and technical approach. But 
confusion and inconsistency still persist among programs they 
observed (terminology, feedback loops, etc.).  Also, most programs 
are still focusing upon the initial project increment, and often there 
was pressure for end-state capabilities in the first spiral—causing 
programs to become more like single-steps-to-full-capability. 
However, to these authors it comes as no surprise that the 
advanced capability most needed is likely to depend on the offerings 
of the least mature technology or binary-type requirements. And we 
shall later illustrate with a case from our own experience. 
2. “All of the case studies point to the conclusion that the capabilities 
and requirements definition and management processes are major 
challenges in all EA programs. Appropriate structuring of 
evolutionary acquisition phases with operationally useful threshold 
requirements and mapping the path to overall objective capability 
are demanding tasks on most evolutionary acquisition programs” 
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3. “The use of the officially preferred spiral development process for 
implementing evolutionary acquisition on major hardware acquisition 
programs greatly increases the level of program uncertainties, 
raising serious challenges for program managers in the current 
acquisition environment”  (Lorell, Lowell, & Younossi, 2006). The 
open-endedness and uncertainties of evolutionary acquisition that 
offer valuable flexibility are proving to be politically impractical, 
especially for large, high-visibility programs. Smaller programs get 
less scrutiny and could be more flexible, but even they have 
demands for definitive budgets—within an inflexible PPBE system 
that is incongruent with spiral policy tenets. The uncertainties of 
future requirements and technologies greatly challenge the validity 
of life-cycle costs (LCC) estimates, and with increasing up-front and 
on-going cost analyst community workload.  “Evolutionary costing” 
appears to be speculative and could give rise to allegations of less-
than-full disclosure. RAND also observed that, “There is no question 
that increased program complexity is an inherent attribute of the 
evolutionary acquisition approach. This is because evolutionary 
acquisition envisions multiple increments, all of which are treated in 
a management sense as quasi-separate programs, with their own 
milestone reviews, oversight documentation, and so forth. This 
complexity is increased by the tendency to move (program) content 
around from one increment to another”  (Lorell, Lowell, & Younossi, 
2006) 
The RAND authors pondered the applicability of evolutionary acquisition to 
“large-scale hardware” programs, saying the data and analysis is still incomplete on 
non-space Major Defense Acquisition Programs. They reiterated the differences 
between DoD space and non-space programs, but extended some of their findings 
to other programs in general. They summarized the views of non-space program 
office officials interviewed as: 
A cost-effective program requires stable requirements, system configuration, 
and quantities, and adequate funding. In their view, evolutionary acquisition 
and spiral development approaches promote constant flux in all these 
program attributes, leading inevitably to cost estimating difficulties and cost 
growth. The definition of program content in the Global Hawk (UAV) program, 
using spiral development and user feedback “created continuous change and 
uncertainty in all aspects of program management and cost analysis. 
According to the Global Hawk prime contractor, the program has experienced 
unprecedented levels of ‘requirements churn’ (Lorell, Lowell, & Younossi, 
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is that the only way to implement spiral development effectively was to 
provide unlimited funding to cover the unending changes” (Lorell, Lowell, & 
Younossi, 2006; emphasis added) 
Thus, RAND highlighted the evolutionary acquisition challenges of 
requirements and technology churn, spiral or increment definition and content, 
program complexity and concurrency, logistics planning and density, funding 
coordination for increments, the regulatory environment, and oversight requirements. 
These are challenges in any program, but RAND feels (and these authors agree) 
that evolutionary acquisition presents the opportunity for them to be even more 
formidable. The RAND study validated several of our previously published concerns 
about evolutionary acquisition and is predictive of others (i.e., funding challenges 
and uncertainty, organizational stress, excessive regulation and scrutiny). However, 
as with most aspects of program management, there are trade-offs to be made and 
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Anecdotal Clues for Coping with Variety and 
Complexity 
With chaotic and uncontrolled change, we envision the risks of unpredictable 
and disruptive interactions between agents and environments. But all change is not 
disruptive or negative. We might need only to look at our experience to realize some 
hints about beneficial variety and successful control of change. One of the most 
visible examples of product (and capability) variety of late has been in the small 
arms arena, where a plethora of individual weapon configurations are seen in the 
many photographs of troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldiers are able to 
individualize their weapons with infrared aiming devices, flashlights, forward pistol 
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Figure 8. Variety of Individual Combat Weapon Configurations 
Such was not the case until the advent of war following the September 11th, 
2001, attacks in New York City and Washington DC. Prior to that, configurations of 
the M16A2 rifle were standardized among Army units, such that the benefits of an 
optional telescopic sight and mount were considered too burdensome for logistical 
and combat command and control at troop level. However, from dozens of informal 
interviews of returning officers, the collective explanation of how deployed units are 
able to manage variety in the field is via individual ownership and accountability: The 
troops are now issued a rifle in basic training that accompanies them throughout 
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recent past, for their own configuration and operator maintenance of their weapons. 










Figure 9. American Soldiers are Accountable for their Individual Weapons 
upon Entry (Army Times, 2007, February 12) 
In the same way, much higher levels of risk from system complexity are 
generally believed to be mitigated by control measures, as within organizational 
contingency theory (i.e., centralization/decentralization, etc.).22 The American nuclear 
Navy was rooted in Captain Hyman G. Rickover’s visit to Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory in 1946 to investigate the feasibility of using nuclear power aboard 
submarines. During his long tenure as head of the nuclear program, he maintained 
fundamental principles about technical and organizational program structures, not 
                                            
22 The theory holds that organizational structures must change in response to contingencies of size, 
technology, and as external environments become more complex and dynamic.  See Woodward, J. 
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the least of which was personal accountability. During his testimony before 
Congress about a nuclear accident at the Army’s Stationary Low-power Plant 
Number 1 in Idaho, which killed three technicians, he said: 
I have many people carrying out tasks in the program and I hold them 
accountable to me for those tasks. But if anything important goes wrong in my 
program, is there any doubt in your minds who is responsible? I will tell you 
right now, in case there is any uncertainty about it, I am responsible. 
(Rockwell, 1992) 
Those who have worked with acquisition of nuclear plant materials know well 
both the specifications and standards of quality unique to this commodity as well as 
Rickover’s tenets of responsibility and accountability that still exist today. It is largely 
believed to be one important aspect of how he successfully dealt with the 
complexities and uncertainties of a new application of technology.  
Another recent example of successful control of rapid change lies in the 
Acoustic Rapid Cots Insertion/Advanced Processing Build (A-RCI/PB). In this vital 
program for sustainment of submarine acoustic sensing superiority, a series of 
hardware and software upgrades were planned and executed in rapid succession. 
Each emerged with advancement in capability, keeping pace with technology and 
competitive threats, facilitated by rigorous control of interfaces, standards and 
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Observations and Realizations from Historical 
Cases 
History reveals that spiral development for large complex hardware systems 
can be a successful approach. One of these authors was fortunate to have helped 
lead the development effort on two fielded missile systems that are now combat-
proven and still in production: the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) that 
premiered in the first Gulf War and the Javelin anti-tank missile now being used in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Both were born out of DARPA initiatives and became major 
acquisition category (ACAT) 1D (OSD-level review) programs.  And both have 
experienced variety and change, but with very different acquisition strategies. 







Figure 10. The Army Tactical Missile System Components 
Launcher, Missile, and Missile Launch Pod Container 
The Army Tactical Missile System program successfully used evolutionary 
acquisition with both incremental and spiral approaches. In the 1980s, the Army 
sought to achieve an organic deep-strike (greater than 100km range) capability by 
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40km range) with a semi-ballistic missile. (See Figure 10.)  An anti-
personnel/materiel missile would be developed with each one containing roughly 
1000 one-pound bomblets. The weapon would, in the next increment, be further 
enhanced by evolving to a warhead that could dispense “smart,” or guided, 
submunitions. This was viewed as a simply articulated, pre-planned product 
improvement (P3I) acquisition strategy that incrementally attained fully envisioned 









Figure 11. Army TACMS Program Strategy Visual Depiction 
The program office commenced a 48-month advanced development effort in 
1986, skipping a technology development phase, and using a pair of Firm-Fixed 
Price (FFP) contracts: one for invention of the missile and one for its integration into 
the MLRS platform (with the same contractor—LTV Corporation—prime vendor of 
the platform). Critical technologies in the initial capability Block I (M39) were: solid 
rocket motor propulsion, fusing of bomblet dispense and detonation, missile and 
launcher navigation, software for missile guidance and launcher fire control.  All 
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did not yet exist).  A Honeywell navigational laser ring gyroscope that was employed 
in Boeing 727 aircraft was used for the missile guidance set. M-74 bomblets and 
fuses from decommissioned LANCE conventional missiles were downloaded and 
used as government-furnished material (GFM) for the warhead. Mechanical safe-
arm fuses were dually used for warhead dispense and warhead severance 
packages (later evolving to electronic safe-arm fuses). Missile hardware component 
size and weight were only constrained by the limits of the MLRS platform’s 
architecture, and a requirement for handling and external appearance similarity with 
the shorter-ranged rockets it was replacing. Launcher modifications included 
additions and modifications to several line-replaceable unit (LRU) components—
again, most fitting easily and as relatively independent modular components within 
the platform architecture. They augmented electronic power and its distribution to 
the launcher system and improved launcher position determination. 
Mature Technology Shortens Product Cycle-time 
ATACMS entered low-rate initial production a full year prior to operational 
testing and evaluation, based upon accomplishments during development testing. 
The Block I program finished on budget and culminated in a highly successful 
operational test, still using development units as test articles, and extending only 
three months beyond the 48-month contract period.  Four months later, the full-rate 
production pricing options were preserved when ATACMS was approved for full-rate 
production by OSD-level review, only one week prior to their expiration. ATACMS 
entered the Persian Gulf War with its operational test unit firing about 32 production 
missiles in combat (Redstone Arsenal, 2007).  
Truly, this was a low-risk program that was structured commensurately.  One 
of its key lessons was that even though it was an entirely new product, the extensive 
use of mature technology eliminated at least one development phase, greatly 
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normally reserved for the certainties of production. It was never envisioned to grow 
into an evolutionary family of many different missiles23 from planned and unplanned 
developmental increments (more than 450 of which have been fired during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom). There were other lessons to be learned from this program 
as well. In terms of ex poste facto “product discovery,” the Joint Force Air 
Component Commander for the Korean theater in 1995 surfaced an issue of service 
“ownership” of the recently deployed ATACMS capability. Despite its years in 
development (and with initial US Air Force participation in its requirements 
generation and program formulation), ATACMS’s ability to engage target sets that 
were previously only within range of USAF aircraft was not yet fully realized by all 
components. This led to a revisiting of service roles and missions within the theater. 
From a product-development perspective, an elegant and open architecture enabled 
a series of planned and unplanned system variants to emerge. 
Planned and Unplanned Variants 
A low-level, internal technology development program had been conducted by 
the same program office in parallel with the ATACMS development project. It used a 
subordinate product manager and matrix personnel from within the PMO and 
supporting R&D community. It was an real option to fulfill the vision of a Block II anti-
armor capability. However, what actually became the smart submunition for 
ATACMS, thirteen of them in each missile, was the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition, 
or BAT. The ATACMS Block II (M39E3) BAT (originally for Brilliant Anti-Tank) smart 
submunition program was quite a different program and employed a different 
contractor (Northrop Grumman). After a lengthy technology development effort 
(1984-1991) under a separate program office, BAT entered advanced development 
as ATACMS went into full-rate production, and later merged with the ATACMS 
program office (in 1994). The BAT was to employ both acoustic and infrared (IR) 
                                            
23 There was, however, a vision of an MFOM (MLRS Family of Munitions)—both rockets and 
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guidance and, upon release from the ATACMS carrier, to glide aerodynamically and 
autonomously attack mobile armored targets (GAO, 1997, October). Among the 
critical technologies for its capability were acoustic sensor, infrared seeker, tandem 
shaped-charge warhead, and digital processing. It was to enter low-rate production 
in 1995 after 40 months of development effort. It finally did so in 1998 after 
significant cost and schedule overruns (GAO, 1999, July 30, p. 5). Highlighted in the 
GAO’s report on DoD’s pursuit of immature technologies during advanced 
development, these were cited as “main contributor(s) to the program’s 88-percent 
cost growth and 62-percent slip in schedule.” The BAT program, while an example of 
incremental pre-planned capability growth and parallel development, serves perhaps 
as a better example of over-ambitious scheduling and flawed cost estimation. 
Nevertheless, the capability of deep-attack anti-armor was eventually added to the 
Army’s portfolio of needed capabilities, and the submunition itself was also 
incrementally improved via P3I.24 
Spiral development came into play for the ATACMS with the proliferation of 
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology, and when post-Persian Gulf War 
analysis revealed a need for an even longer-range strike capability. These 
feedbacks from the technological environment and user community drove an 
innovative development approach to attain a substantial extension in ATACMS 
range and with precision accuracy. GPS augmentation of the standard missile 
guidance set reduced circular error probable (increased accuracy), and allowed for a 
reduction in bomblet payload (by over 600 bomblets) such that the range could be 
extended to well over 250km. These “unplanned” system improvements took place 
while the Block I system was in full-rate production, and Block II was still under 
development. Block IA (M39A1) entered low-rate production in 1996 and 1997, with 
full-rate production in 1998. Though not touted as such until now, this initially 
                                            
24 A BAT P3I (M39E4) program, funded through 2002, provided a new sensor suite with millimeter 
wave and imaging infra-red to the basic BATs acoustic and infra-red sensors. It improved inclement-
weather capability and effectiveness against countermeasures, along with expansion of the 
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undefined and incremental change in system configuration and operational capability 
epitomizes the philosophy of hardware spiral development in acquisition. 
Again in December 2000, and as a result of Kosovo lessons learned by the 
Army in 1999, a Quick Reaction Program was initiated to rapidly attain another 
tactical capability—that of a large unitary munition. Designated the Army TACMS 
Block IA Unitary missile, a development contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin 
(formerly LTV until 1992) to employ another GFM munition—this time a proven 
unitary warhead from the Stand-off Land Attack Missile (HARPOON WAU-23/B)—to 
be integrated into the Army TACMS Block IA missile. The first missile was delivered 
within four months after contract award, with 41 more produced through the end of 
2001. Program supporters said the rapid achievement, "clearly demonstrate(d) the 
versatility and agility of the Army TACMS design” (Lockheed Martin, 2001, April 23). 
Changes in technology and user needs gave birth to yet another ATACMS 
variant in the 2001-2005 timeframe: the ATACMS-P, or Penetrator. This is a standoff 
ballistic missile, delivering an earth-penetrating warhead for use against fixed hard 
and deeply buried strategic and tactical targets (US Army RDT&E, 2004, February). 
This system is employed from both the M270A1 MLRS platform and the newer, 
wheeled vehicular High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). The ATACMS-P 
began as a Joint service Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration integrating 
the Army TACMS booster with a Navy Strategic Systems Program (SSP) re-entry 
vehicle built by Sandia National Laboratories. Funded under the BAT P3I RDT&E 
line, it was conceived for attacking high-value targets that were perceived threats to 
US and coalition forces in the post-9/11 campaigns. Successful test flights in March 
of 2004 and August of 2005 demonstrated test objectives of booster separation and 
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An Architecture for Variety, and the Need for Control 
In all, these ATACMS program variants comprise a validated chronicle of 
operationalized evolutionary acquisition over more than two decades. While not 
applicable to all programs, perhaps because of each systems’ unique product 
attributes, these multiple product releases show at least the ability to respond to 
changing technology and user needs given time, funds, and a simple architecture 
that can accommodate change. Similarly, other large ground vehicles, naval vessels 
and airframes in particular, because perhaps of their larger frames, seem to 
accommodate modular upgrades easily. As alluded to earlier, some munitions also 
lend themselves somewhat to variety without some of the usual attendant support 
costs because of their “wooden” nature—a term used to describe maintenance-free 
end-items. “Deep Attack” modified MLRS launchers did indeed have relatively 
independent modules and open critical interfaces, for electrical power supplies, 
navigation, fire control subsystems, etc. For optimal emphasis and control, the 
vehicle integration effort was considered to be significant—thus, the separate 
contract for it. 
Interestingly, variety proved itself a menace to the ATACMS program after 
production was initiated. A change in the ATACMS Block I production design 
resulted in a rocket motor nozzle burn-through, discovered during production-
verification testing. Failure analysis concluded that a material specification was 
insufficient for the application, but wasn’t evidenced until a change of component 
suppliers. Moreover, the failure revealed both government and contractor had 
insufficient configuration control when uncertainty arose over which missiles had the 
deficient component. This small change—to save only $15.00 per missile—
necessitated a very expensive retrofit of dozens of missiles (Army TACMS Project 













Figure 12.  ATACMS Nozzle Exit Cone Assembly Burn-through 
While the only officially recorded test failure from this cause was at the White 
Sands, New Mexico Missile Range, anecdotal evidence from a returned Persian Gulf 
War explosive ordnance disposal specialist indicated at least one of the munitions 
fired there experienced the same failure mode, and is thus believed to have been 
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Figure 13. The Javelin Anti-tank Weapon System (Missile and Command 
Launch Unit) 
The Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System—Medium (AAWS-M), later to 
become the Javelin, began in 1982 as the DARPA program “Tank Breaker” 
(stinet.dtic.mil) (See Figure 13.) This was a one-year technology demonstration to 
explore various missile guidance solutions for a medium range (i.e., 1-2000 meters), 
man-portable, anti-tank weapon. It was spawned as a result of deficiencies that were 
immediately apparent in the newly fielded DRAGON weapon system, which had 
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guided line-of-sight missile that was developed in response to the 1960s appearance 
of the Soviet AT-3 SAGGER, a manpack missile carried in a fiberglass "suitcase." In 
1978, a Mission Need Statement highlighted deficiencies of the Dragon, such as its 
poor reliability, limited range/lethality, and the difficulty for gunners to aim and track 
targets. The envisioned replacement was to satisfy a substantial increase in 
requirements, namely: range, lethality, reduced weight, and the ability to launch from 
enclosures (such as buildings or field-fortified bunkers). Several years were spent 
finalizing these requirements until the joint Army and Marine Corps operational 
requirements document was formally approved in 1986-88. A competitive fly-off 
program, which would now be called the “Technology Development phase,” was 
conducted in 1987-1989 to select from three teams of contractors and critical 
technologies: a laser-beam rider led by Ford Aerospace, a fiber-optic guidance effort 
led by Hughes, and a forward-looking infra-red (FLIR) thermal imaging sensor effort 
from Texas Instruments and Martin-Marietta. Cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts 
were used with each of the three teams. All three teams were successful in flying 
missiles to their targets, but the only technology that enabled a true fire-and-forget 
capability (which was not a specified requirement) was the Forward-Looking Infra-
Red (FLIR) approach, enabled by a comparatively new technology: focal plane 
arrays (FPA). Though this approach was recognized to be the most technically 
immature and risky, the desire for fire-and-forget survivability resulted in the FLIR 
team being awarded a contract for a three-year advanced development phase.   
In June of 1989, a full-scale development (now called System Development 
and Demonstration) contract was awarded for the AAWS-M project. At the macro 
level, the office of the Secretary of Defense viewed the program as acceptable with 
regard to risk because of its 27-month technology development phase, use of real 
options for a technical solution, and subsequent 36-month plan for full-scale 
development. At the program office level, it was known to be one of high risk in 
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Immature Technology Lengthens Product Cycle-time 
Technology risks were adjudged to be in the following areas: focal plane array 
producibility (from the standpoint of specified temperature sensitivity), tandem 
warhead performance (pushing the physical limits of armor penetration versus 
package size), software tracker algorithm (to maintain a target lock with optical 
correlation of target characteristics supplied by the FLIR), two-stage rocket motor 
(which would enable “soft launch” from enclosures), electronic fusing (timing in 
micro-seconds for the dual warheads and dual motors) and system weight (also 
pushing the physical limits of cubic dimension) (Lyons, Long, & Chait, 2006, July). 
All of these technical risk areas would be considered as immature by today’s TRL 
standards (see Figure 14). 
During the technology development phase, all three contractor teams had 
scored over 62% hits with at least ten missile shots each in a variety of 
environments and operational settings. The full-scale development contract request 
for proposal was written for a cost-plus-incentive-fee type of contract, giving 
incentives for key performance parameters such as weight and warhead 
performance considered to be technically risky. The total value of the contract was 
$169.7 million, the amount bid by the winning team of Texas Instruments and Martin-
Marietta, who formed a Joint Venture. Meanwhile, the Government privately 
conducted its own should-cost estimate and budgeted $263 million for the thirty-six 
month long advanced development effort. In addition, the Government ran its own 
alternate warhead technology development program with Conventional Munitions 
Systems (CMS) acting as the contractor.  
The two-partner Joint Venture in full-scale development was also free to 
maximize competition at the subcontractor level. In their make-versus-buy decision, 
Texas Instruments elected to make the focal plane array for both of its uses in the 
command launch unit and in the missile. The company had made these devices for 
other programs, but not in these two distinct configurations. Focal plane array 
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technology readiness level 5 (on a 1-9 scale) despite its successful technology-
development phase results. It was always recognized as technologically risky, so the 
Government funded its own night-vision laboratory to partially fund other companies 
that could produce these devices. In 1991, the only five known FPA makers in the 
world were: Rockwell International, Loral, Santa Barbara Research Corporation, 
Sofradir (a French firm), and Texas Instruments.  
As an additional gauge of technological maturity, a comparative baseline test 
was mandated at the second milestone upon the decision to launch the Javelin 
program into full-scale development. That test would pit the immature focal plane 
array technology against existing TOW and Dragon (legacy systems) night-viewing 
optics. Results of this test showed the Javelin's immature focal plane arrays to be 
substantially better in performance than the Dragon and almost as effective as the 
larger TOW anti-tank missile system.  
However, approximately eighteen months after the full-scale development-
phase contract award, the Javelin project manager forecasted a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach of cost and scheduling thresholds in this ACAT 1-D program, and called for a 
non-milestone Defense Acquisition Board review. Several reasons were cited; chief 
among them was that the focal plane array production yield was not as predicted, 
and all of the devices were below specification.  Weight was also a significant 
contributor (even after a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved 
requirement threshold change (from 45 to 49.5 pounds)), causing redesign of many 
components for reduction. 
Over the next year, the program sought a new baseline with many different 
revised program estimates—climbing from 36 months duration and $298 million in 
cost, to 48 months duration and $372 million in cost, and finally 54 months and $420 
million for the total cost and duration of this phase. Within that year, the program 
was restructured, given the new baseline, and finished largely within its new 
parameters. The additional eighteen months added to the 36-month phase helped 
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schedule slippage. Later, production quantities were slashed in half as the Defense 
Department drew down its forces from 1991-2000, and the acquisition strategy to 
split apart the Joint Venture and compete them in production was not fulfilled. 
Benefits of a split production no longer able to be realized, the Joint Venture 
remained intact as the producing entity.  
Unplanned Variety and the Need for Control 
The GAO was harshly critical of the Army’s plan to enter a multi-year contract 
(seeking to stabilize contractor workload and achieve economies of scale). After 
several years of Low-rate Initial Production (1994-96), the GAO stated that, “The 
Army has not demonstrated that Javelin’s design is sufficiently stable for a multiyear 
contract” (GAO, 1996, September; emphasis added). But the Army proceeded to 
enter multi-year contracts in 1997 and 2000, despite at least 30% of all system 
components experiencing redesign during low-rate production.  
 Moving to performance specifications under the last acquisition reform era 
(1994-99), the program began to relinquish configuration control to the contractor 
and saw continuing redesigns for virtually all system-configuration items. Like the 
GAO, the program management office also sought design stability and had 
significant concerns over a continually changing production baseline. The program 
management office realized during this period that the Government must be 
accountable for prescribing the entire system's performance margins and remain 
vigilant to insure the contractor doesn't "trade off" hard-won design margins to lower 
unit costs (Knox, 1999, September).  This was found to be especially true in 
technical areas that can seriously impact operations and support cost/performance. 
Similarly, it is not always possible to realistically test the contractor’s compliance with 
performance requirements and whether the system is still operationally effective and 
suitable. Communication and trust, with verification, are necessary facets of the 
government-industry partnership (Zolin & Dillard, 2005, May). And some entity still 
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 Acquisition reforms were not intended to remove discipline, but to eliminate 
non-value added bureaucracy. As with the ATACMS rocket motor case failure, there 
must be strict configuration control. And as practitioners are expected to know, 
configuration management is not for the prevention of change, but rather for 
controlled, approved, and documented change.  Used appropriately, it provides a 
disciplined approach for managing change to a system’s design so that any change 
is analyzed—from a system and life-cycle perspective—for its potential impacts.  
The Javelin program had always planned to employ interim contractor 
logistics support enroute to some eventual level of organic system support 
(principally of its target acquisition device, not of the munition). Since the Javelin’s 
design was in such a state of flux, and an organic stockage of spares therefore 
impractical, the best approach may have been to purchase spares from a contractor-
generated representative spares list and allow for just-in-time delivery. Though the 
government in fact bought more support than needed, this idea is commensurate 
with the contractor’s control of the configuration and its susceptibility to change 
without government approval (or even knowledge).  Today, Javelin is viewed as 
being a totally successful weapon system despite its earlier programmatic 
shortcomings. It is being used in combat operations and has been through several 
full-rate production contract periods.  Over 1000 Javelin missiles have been fired in 
the Iraq War and Afghanistan since March of 2003, with close to 98% reliability. The 
system design has continued to be upgraded—not as blocks of capability—but with 
software, warhead and producibility enhancements; the design of the Javelin has 
become very “evolutionary” indeed—but not in the manner of evolutionary 
acquisition’s “planned increments of capability.”25 
                                            
25 Acknowledging however, production variants FGM-148A, B, and C; see DoD 4120.15-L, "Model 
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Synthesis of the Cases 
Our concise cases here only demonstrate that leap-ahead capabilities can 
result from different acquisition approaches. But it would be difficult to assert that a 
spiral development approach could have been taken with Javelin that would have 
resulted in the same capability leaps, or even earlier delivery of some lesser 
capability, since many of Javelin’s key performance parameters depended upon 
immature technologies (or binary ones, such as soft-launch), and man-rating. The 
comparison below provides a summary of key program characteristics in the two 
munition programs (Figure 14). 
Figure 14. Comparison of Programs Using Different Development Approaches 
and Technology Readiness Levels 
Both programs achieved capability leaps and have performed splendidly in 
combat operations. Being only two cases, they cannot alone prove our assertions. 
But they do illustrate that two munition programs of the same acquisition category 
and timeframe, with very different technology readiness levels and project scope, 
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as different as these programs were in product size and mission capability, they help 
to convey what program managers must realize about spiral development:  
a. That it is an approach primarily for reduction of product cycle-time;  
b. It is enabled by the advanced development of only mature 
technologies; 
c. That a system’s physical properties (mutability), along with other 
factors such as time criticality and user risk, binary vs. continuous 
requirements, required maintenance, and modular interdependence, 
etc., will influence spiral development applicability; 
d. That key capabilities may in fact depend upon the least mature 
technologies; 
e. That an “open,” or at least elegant, system architecture enables a 
basis for independent modular variety; 
f. And that thorough design specification and configuration-management 
accountability is essential for managing the complexity of multiple 
product releases. 
There are many other currently deployed systems that have undergone a long 
series of upgrades. At Appendix A and B respectively are thirty variants (spanning 
30 years) of the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter and ten variants (spanning 50 years) of 
the C-130 Hercules aircraft programs, shown as a chronology of their product 
variation and key capabilities added.  Of course, these “spirals” have been realized 
as product upgrades, but they have indeed been the result of user feedback and 
mature technology insertion. It becomes apparent that all spirals will eventually 
become defined increments— “mini-programs.” They are often then popularly 
termed as “spirals,” despite their definition. But in years past, they have often been 
implemented as sequential, separate, and successive product upgrades (also as 
program examples are the CH-47 helicopter26 and B-52 bomber). But current policy 
                                            
26 Chinook helicopters have been product-improved as the CH-47F model.  Six were deployed last 
year with more powerful engines and avionics improvements. The airframe design is more than 20 
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expresses spirals as more concurrent, frequent and continuous. And that may bring 
about some of the organizational risks we have already, and will further, discuss. 
Modeling Evolutionary Acquisition 
In this section, we present our work with the simulation of various project 
scenarios under evolutionary acquisition (incremental and spiral) and a single-step 
development approach. This modeling further tests the concepts described and 
discussed above and provides different insights into the impacts of spiral 
development on acquisition project performance.  
The Modeling Approach 
A computational experimentation approach to investigating acquisition 
projects is applied. This approach integrates theory and practice in a computational 
tool that allows controlled experimentation through simulation. The current work 
reflects project theory (e.g., the theory of constraints and work flows), product 
development theory (e.g., rework impacts and work dependencies), and 
management theory (e.g., resource allocation and information theory). Practice is 
reflected in the model through the use of case studies as described in the literature 
cited to build and validate the model structures and the calibration and testing using 
the acquisition projects described above. A computational experimentation approach 
provides many advantages over purely laboratory or field-based methods and 
benefits from several of the strengths of both laboratory and field research. Nissen 
and Buettner (2004) describe and discuss the computational experimentation 
approach, and Dillard and Nissen (2007) describe its application to investigating 
acquisition projects.  
The system dynamics methodology was applied for model development and 
use. System dynamics uses a computational experimentation approach to 
understanding and improving dynamically complex systems. The system dynamics 
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nonlinear relationships in managerial control. The methodology’s ability to model 
many diverse system components (e.g., work, people, money), processes (e.g., 
design, technology development, quality assurance), and managerial decision-
making and actions (e.g., forecasting, resource allocation) makes it useful for 
investigating acquisition projects. Forrester (1961) develops the methodology's 
philosophy and Sterman (2000) specifies the modeling process with examples and 
describes numerous applications. System dynamics has been applied to projects for 
several decades and has built a collection of validated development project 
structures (Lyneis & Ford, 2007). When applied to projects, system dynamics 
focuses on how performance evolves in response to interactions among 
development strategy (e.g., spiral development vs. traditional), managerial decision-
making (e.g., scope developed in specific blocks) and development processes (e.g., 
concurrence). System dynamics is considered appropriate for modeling acquisition 
projects because of its ability to explicitly model these and other critical aspects of 
development projects (Ford & Sterman, 1998; Cooper, 1993a;b;c; Cooper & Mullen, 
1993; Cooper, 1994). System dynamics has been successfully applied to a variety of 
project management issues, including failures in project fast-track implementation 
(Ford & Sterman, 2003b), poor schedule performance (Abdel-Hamid, 1988), and the 
impacts of changes (Rodrigues & Williams, 1997; Cooper, 1980) and concealing 
rework requirements (Ford & Sterman, 2003a) on project performance. See Lyneis 
and Ford (2007) for a review of the application of system dynamics to projects.  
The model is based on previously developed system dynamics models of 
product development in several industries and the military that have been developed 
and tested over several decades, as described and referenced below. Therefore, the 
model is founded on well-established and tested components. These previous 
models have developed structures for many components and aspects of acquisition. 
However, previous models have not been used to investigate acquisition 
approaches such as spiral or incremental development as used by the DoD. The 
current model uses previous model parts to build a project model that can reflect the 
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is purposefully simple relative to actual practice to expose the relationships between 
acquisition approaches and acquisition project performance. For example, total 
resource quantities and productivities are assumed fixed. Simulated performances 
using different acquisition approaches are, therefore, considered relative and useful 
for gaining insight and developing acquisition strategies, but not sufficient for the 
management of specific acquisition programs or projects. This research approach 
allows the investigation to focus on how acquisition approaches impact project 
performance.  
A Conceptual Model of Incremental Development 
The model structure reflects the structure of acquisition projects. The 
conceptual (high-level) model structure will be described, followed by a more 
detailed description of how critical acquisition project features are modeled in the 
formal (computer-simulation) form of the model.  
In the model, four types of work flow through each block of an acquisition 
project: requirements, technologies, product component designs, and products. 
Within a development block, each type of work flows through a development phase 
that completes a critical aspect of the project: 1) develop requirements, 2) develop 
technologies, 3) design product components (advanced development), and 4) 
manufacture products. The exception is requirements, which also measures 
progress through the final phase, 5) user product testing. Development phases and 
information flows in a single block as depicted in the model are shown in Figure 15. 
Arrows between phases indicate primary information flows. The start of all phases 
except the development of requirements is constrained by the completion of 
previous (“upstream”) phases. The completion of some requirements allows the start 
of technology development, reflecting the concurrent nature of this portion of 
acquisition. Both requirements development and technology development must be 
completed for Advanced Development to begin. In turn, the completion of Advanced 
Development allows manufacturing to start. When some product has been 
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15 also identifies the five major reviews within a single acquisition block (A, B, 
Design Readiness Review, C, and Full Rate Production) at their approximate times 
during a project. As described previously, these reviews add work beyond that 
needed to complete the basic products of each phase (requirements, technologies, 
designs, products, and readiness for use confirmation).  
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Figure 15. Information Flows in a Single-block Acquisition Project 
All development processes are constrained by the physical and information 
relationships among the activities and phases within a development block. These 
constraints include development activity durations and precedence relationships, 
information dependencies leading to iteration (Smith & Eppinger, 1997b), the 
availability of work (Ford & Sterman, 1998), coordination mechanisms (Hauptman & 
Hirji, 1996), the characteristics of information transferred among development 
phases (Krishnan, 1996), and the number, skill and experience of project staff 
(Abdel-Hamid, 1988). These processes and policies can interact to constrain 
progress. Even when resources are ample, progress can be constrained by the 
interdependencies among phases and work packages.  
As an example, a development activity that is significantly simpler than most 
acquisition projects will first be used to illustrate process constraints. Consider the 
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member (the columns, beams and bracing) must be installed, inspected, and 
corrected if the installation is found to be defective. These activities can only occur in 
a specific order: install, inspect, approve or discover a problem, rework, and re-
inspect. When no further problems are found the work is approved and released so 
other work dependent on that task can proceed (e.g., installation of floors, walls, 
etc.). In addition to the process constraint imposed by the sequence of activities, if 
an error is found, the affected supervisors and skilled trades must work together to 
communicate the problem and devise a plan to remedy it (coordination) before the 
error can be corrected (rework). Similar processes are used to develop products that 
are much more complex and unique. For example, the design of focal plane arrays 
for the Javelin project required an initial design of each component, the testing of the 
designs (perhaps by review by another designer), the approval of designs for 
release (e.g., to develop a prototype) or identification of a required change, and 
retesting. The basic development processes are similar in both the steel beam and 
focal plane examples. Important characteristics (described next and later) are used 
to describe important differences.    
Development activity durations also constrain progress. For any given 
technology, a certain minimum amount of time is required for each activity—even 
when resources are ample. These constraints are captured in the model with 
specific development activities and backlogs of work in individual phases of an 
acquisition block (more detail later).  
In addition, performing many types of development work depend on the 
development of other “upstream” work. This availability of work based on the 
completion of previous work is an important form of progress constraint. Critical path 
theory models these constraints with precedence relationships that constrain the 
beginning and end of activities. However, in practice, upstream development can 
constrain downstream activities throughout their overlapping time, not just in activity 
beginnings and endings. Returning to the steel erection example, the steel members 
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are in place because the lower floors must support those above. Slow development 
(installation) of lower floors will constrain the development of upper floors. In the 
Javelin project, the targeting component design was dependent on the development 
of focal plane array technology. This type of dependency is captured in our model by 
precedence or concurrence relationships.  
Precedence relationships can constrain progress within (internal) a single 
development phase or between (external) phases. The feedback structure for 
precedence relationships within a phase is shown in Figure 16 with a causal loop 
diagram. In causal loop diagrams, the variable at the tail end of a causal arrow 
influences the variable at the arrowhead end of the arrow. The polarity at the 
arrowhead indicates the direction of influence. Positive causal relationships cause 
the driven variable to move in the same direction as the change in the driving 
variable. For example, an increase in the Basework (or Initial Completion) rate 
increases the number of Tasks Completed (ceteris paribus, i.e., all other things held 
constant or equal), and a decrease in the Basework rate decreases the number of 
Tasks Completed compared to the number of Tasks Completed if the Basework had 
not decreased. In contrast, negative causal relationships cause the driven variable to 
move in the opposite direction as the change in the driving variable. For example, an 
increase in the Minimum Basework Duration (e.g., minimum time to design a 
component) would cause a decrease in the Basework rate and vice versa. See 
Sterman (2000) for more description and examples of causal loop diagramming for 
modeling causal systems driven by feedback. Causal loop diagrams also identify 
and label feedback loops. Reinforcing loops (labeled “R”) generate behavior that 
moves values farther and farther from their initial values in one direction faster and 




































Figure 16.  Development Progress Constrained by an Internal (within a Phase) 
Precedence Relationship  
The feedback structure shown in the Figure 16 models the increase in the 
number of tasks which are available to the Basework activity due to the completion 
of work. In this loop, an increased Basework rate raises the number of Tasks 
Completed, which raises the total number of tasks which can be completed. The 
total number of tasks which can be completed includes both tasks which have been 
completed and tasks which are available and waiting to be completed. This quantity 
of tasks is also dependent on the nature of the development process as described 
by the process's Internal Precedence Relationship. Increasing the number of Tasks 
Completed & Waiting to be Completed raises the Tasks Available for Basework and, 
thereby, further raises the Basework rate. 
In addition, the Basework of most phases cannot be done without information, 
materials, and components provided by other upstream phases. For example, the 
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these constraints through concurrence relationships. Concurrence relationships 
answer the question, “How much work can we now complete given the work 
released by the phases upon which we depend?” Reconsider the erection of the 
steel skeleton of an office building as an example. Erection depends on the release 
of construction drawings by the design phase and the progress of foundation work 
(among others). They would be captured in the model by external (inter-phase) 
concurrence relationships: one describing how much of the steel can be erected 
based on the release of construction drawings and another describing how much 
steel erection can proceed based on the state of the foundations. Either of these 
relationships might constrain steel erection: steel for the ground floor cannot be 
placed until both the foundation is complete and construction drawings for the 
ground floor are released. Each external concurrence relationship describes the 
fraction of a phase’s total scope that can be completed based on the fraction of work 
released by a supplying phase. They are potentially nonlinear, allowing our model to 
capture changes in the degree of dependence among phases as a project evolves. 
For example, chip designers in an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) 
project may be able to develop certain standard elements of the design (memory 
registers, data bus) with early information about customer requirements, but may be 
unable to continue until full specifications for the required functionality are released. 
Figure 17 shows how these constraints on the work that is available for development 































Figure 17.  Development Progress Constrained by an External (between phases) 
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Modeling Incremental Development with Multiple Development Blocks 
Figure 18 depicts an acquisition project with multiple increments or blocks. 
The first block is the same as Figure 15 above. Subsequent blocks have the same 
basic information flow, but can also be delayed by the completion of phases in 
previous blocks or constrained by the progress in their own blocks. Importantly, in 
addition to the flow of information downstream through phases (black arrows in 
Figure 18), multiple iteration acquisition also provides opportunities for information to 
flow upstream, such as from User Product Testing in an earlier iteration to Develop 
Requirements or Advanced Development in a subsequent iteration (red vertical 
arrows in Figure 18).  
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Figure 18. Information Flows in an Incremental Acquisition Project 
In the model, the structure of each block is the same, although parameter 
values are varied to reflect different acquisition projects and strategies. For example, 
all phases include start-up work that is not directly applied to generating 
development products (requirements, technologies, component designs, or 
products). Each phase also includes the requisite review work that also does not 
directly generate product. This is consistent with GAO recommendations to manage 
each development block like an individual project. One impact of this loading of each 
phase with start-up and review work that we suspect has only been recognized 
informally is a significant increase in the total amount of work required to provide a 
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As will be shown with the model, this work has a significant impact on project 
performance that may impact the types of projects in which spiral development can 
be effective.   
A Formal Model of Spiral Development 
The conceptual model described above was used to build a formal computer 
simulation model of an acquisition project that can reflect traditional and incremental 
or spiral development strategies. The simulation model is a system of nonlinear 
differential equations. Each phase is represented by a generic structure, which is 
parameterized to reflect a specific phase of development. The unit of measure for 
development work is the task or work package, an atomic piece of work. Examples 
include writing a line of code or installing a steel beam. When work packages within 
a phase are heterogeneous, the unit of work can be defined as the average amount 
an experienced person can accomplish in a given interval. In the model, a work 
package is estimated to be the amount of work a developer can accomplish in a year 
(e.g., a person-year of work).  
Modeling the Flows of Acquisition Work 
The model represents workflows through a project phase as a value chain of 
alternating backlogs and development activities with two rework cycles (Figure 19). 
The value chain is described with the boxes and pipes with valves along the bottom 
of Figure 19. The value chain passes from the Initial Completion Backlog through the 
Initial Completion Rate into the Quality Assurance Backlog, through the Approval 
Rate into the stock of Work Approved, and through the Release Rate to the 
accumulation of Work Finished and Released. The rework cycle is inherent in 
development projects and has been modeled and used extensively to explain and 
improve project management (Lyneis, Cooper & Els, 2001; Ford & Sterman, 1998; 
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Figure 19.  Work Backlogs and Flows through a Development Phase 
The model used here describes the flows of work through a project in which 
all work starts in the backlog27 of work needing to be initially completed (“Initial 
Completion Backlog,” box at bottom of Figure 19). As work is first completed, it 
enters the stock of work needing quality assurance (QA). Quality assurance could 
take many forms, including reviews of designs by senior engineers, prototype 
building and testing, and the inspection of work. Work needing quality assurance 
accumulates in a Quality Assurance Backlog (box in middle of Figure 19).  If work 
passes QA (either because it is correct or the need for changes is not detected), it is 
approved and adds to the stock of Work Approved. When sufficient work has been 
approved, a package is released, adding to the stock of Work Finished and 
Released to other phases or users. The release package size is a management 
decision, often based on the characteristics of the phase. For example, in 
semiconductor development, the vast majority of the design code must be 
completed prior to release for a prototype build since almost all the code is needed 
to design the masks. In other development settings, managers have broad discretion 
in setting release package sizes.  
                                            
27 Because the flows of development activities reflect the completion of the activity, the backlogs, as 
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Work found to require changes moves into a stock of tasks requiring changes 
that must be resolved through coordination with the phase responsible for the 
problem (“Coordination Backlog”). Classic examples include designers working with 
users to refine ambiguous or infeasible requirements or manufacturing engineers 
meeting with product designers to explain why parts can’t be built as specified in the 
drawings. After coordination resolves disputed issues, these tasks move to the stock 
of work known to need rework (“Known Rework Backlog”) and are subsequently 
reworked, then returned to quality assurance for re-inspection, testing, etc.  
Quality assurance is imperfect, so some tasks requiring rework can be 
missed and are erroneously approved and released. These rework requirements 
may be discovered later by another work phase. In industry, if they are not 
discovered they remain embedded in the product after it is released, to be 
discovered by the customer. In our model of acquisition, we assume that all defects 
are discovered in final product testing by users. When the phase that discovers the 
problem reports it, the generating phase is notified, and the affected tasks are 
moved from the stock of work considered finished to the coordination backlog, then 
eventually reworked. For example, a test phase may discover a short circuit across 
two layers in a prototype chip. If the error is traced to the design, test engineers must 
notify the designers and work with them to specify the location and characteristics of 
the short circuit. The designers then must rework, re-check and re-release the 
design, followed by changes in layout, tape-out, masking, and prototype fabrication.  
Given the arrangement of development activities in a phase described above, 
progress is constrained by the rate at which work packages move through the flows 
that connect the stocks. Four development activities and several development 
features control rates. The initial completion, quality assurance, coordination, and 
rework rates are each the lesser of the rate allowed by the availability of work or the 
resources applied (described later). The rates allowed if the development process 
has infinite resources (i.e., uncapacitated conditions) are described with an average 
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available. Project progress depends largely on how much work gets trapped in the 
rework cycle versus how much "leaks out" of the rework cycle through approval. The 
fraction of work discovered to require rework is used to model project complexity. 
More complex projects are assumed to require more iteration for completion. 
Modeling Concurrence 
As described, concurrence often constrains the rates and development 
progress. Internal precedence constraints are modeled with a (potentially nonlinear) 
function that relates the fraction of a phase’s work that has been released to the 
fraction of the phase’s work that is available for initial completion. For example, an 
internal precedence relationship in which 100% of the work was available regardless 
of the fraction released would reflect a development phase in which all of the work 
can be developed simultaneously. In contrast, an internal precedence relationship 
that starts at 20% of the work being available and rises steadily at a rate of 1 work 
package becoming available for each released until 100% of the work is available 
when 80% has been released would prevent more work from being initially 
completed if 30% of the work had been initially completed but lots of rework 
prevented more than 10% from being released. As examples, three internal 
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Infeasible








































Figure 20. Modeling Concurrence—An Example of Three Internal Precedence 
Relationships 
Like a development phase's Internal Precedence Relationship, an External 
Precedence Relationship between two development phases can act as a bottleneck 
in the availability of work. The Critical Path and PERT methods model static inter-
phase dependencies in development projects and product development research 
(e.g., Rosenthal, 1992; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Eppinger, Whitney, Smith & Gebala, 
1990) by specifying the temporal relationship between start and end-times of 
activities. The purpose of External Precedence Relationships is the same as the 
precedence relationships used in the Critical Path and PERT methods: to describe 
the dependencies of development phases on each other for the initial completion of 
work. However, there are several important differences between External 
Precedence Relationships and precedences used in the Critical Path and PERT 
methods.  
• External Precedence Relationships describe the dependency 
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instead of only at the start and finish of the phases, as in the 
Critical Path and PERT methods.  
• External Precedence Relationships can be nonlinear. 
• External Precedence Relationships describe a dynamic 
relationship between development phases by allowing the 
output (Percent Tasks Available for Initial Completion) to 
fluctuate over the life of the project depending on the current 
conditions of the project, as described by the External 
Precedence Relationship's input (Percent Upstream Tasks 
Released).  
External Precedence Relationships can be used to describe rich inter-phase 
relationships which cannot be described with Critical Path and PERT precedences. 
For example, a downstream phase which is constrained by the release of upstream 
tasks throughout its duration (not only at the beginning or end of the phase) in a 
linear relationship can be described with a "lockstep" External Precedence 
Relationship. Such a relationship could be one that does not make any work 
available until some work has started and increases the amount available steadily at 
2% of the work available per percent released until all of the work is available when 
50% of the upstream work has been released. External Precedence Relationships 
are often nonlinear, as demonstrated by the descriptions of the relationship between 
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Figure 21.  Modeling Concurrence—An Example of Four External Precedence 
Relationships 
Modeling Resources 
The model simulates two types of development resources. Either resource 
type can constrain progress by limiting the development rate. Direct resources are 
the people and associated equipment required to perform the development work, 
i.e., to develop requirements, develop technology, design products, manufacture 
products, and test requirement satisfaction for use. Indirect resources perform 
project management and associated work that support and facilitate development. 
Total direct resources are assumed fixed and allocated based on the backlogs of 
work available to be developed (the stocks represented as boxes in Figure 19). In 
contrast, indirect resources (also assumed fixed) serve the performance of activities 
(the development rates, the pipes with valves in Figure 19) and are distributed 
proportionately based on the size of those development activities. As will be shown, 
the model indicates that, when there are many development activities occurring 
simultaneously (e.g., in spiral development), project management (indirect) 
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Resource allocation for direct and indirect resources is based on allocation 
fractions. Target fractions are the proportion of total indicated demand for resources 
generated by each activity. See Joglekar and Ford (2005) for a detailed description. 
The applications of allocation fraction targets are delayed to reflect the many 
physical and informational processes that are required. Research supports the 
important role of delays in controlling dynamic systems such as acquisition projects. 
For example, structural control system researchers have studied how delays 
between signals from sensors and actuators impact structural system behavior and 
found that purposeful time delays can improve structural behavior over eliminating 
time delays (Mahmoud & Al-Muthairi, 1994; Udwadia, Bremen, Kumar, & Hosseini, 
2003). Allocation delays are modeled with first-order exponential adjustments that 
move applied allocation fractions toward targets a fixed portion of the difference 
between the applied and target fractions each time period (see Lee, Ford, and 
Joglekar, 2007 for more). The speed of adjustment is defined by this resource 
adjustment delay, with large delays generating slower adjustments and vice versa.  
Modeling Project Performance 
Project performance is measured in three dimensions: schedule, cost, and 
performance risk. Schedule performance is measured in the time required to have a 
given number or fraction of requirements tested and approved by users. Cost is 
measured in dollars based on the size of direct and indirect work forces and the 
duration of phases and blocks. Performance risk is measured with the average 
percent of the requirements provided (approved by users) at any given time. This 
average reflects the combination of multiple requirements. Some of the requirements 
may have binary performance, i.e., they work or they don’t work. Other requirements 
may have discrete steps or continuous performance relative to requirements, such 
as weight or unit manufacturing cost. All the requirements can be considered met 
completely when the average percent of the requirements provided is 100% for a 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 84 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Model Calibration and Testing 
The formal model was calibrated to the Javelin project described above. Data 
was collected from a project manager on the project (the first author) concerning the 
scope and work effort of each development phase, start-up and review-work 
requirements, and durations of development phases. For example, the Javelin 
project representatively had 30 requirements, 8 technologies to develop, about 200 
components to design, and 3500 units to manufacture. User Product Testing 
validated the 30 requirements. These were modeled as performance units. Work 
packages, representing a fixed amount of effort, flow through the model. The 
number of work packages required to develop each performance unit was estimated 
using project manager estimates of the total work required in each phase.28 Behavior 
data on the Javelin project was also collected. The Javelin project utilized a single 
development block. Developing Requirements and Developing Technologies were 
each estimated to take about 2 years, and Advanced Development was estimated to 
have taken 4.5 years. Total costs were estimated to be approximately $700million.  
Model Testing 
As discussed above, the model was developed as a tool to investigate the 
impacts of acquisition strategies, not to predict specific project performance. 
Therefore, consistent with the system dynamics approach, the behavior modes 
(shapes of behaviors over time) and how behavior modes differ with acquisition 
strategies is important, not exactly when changes or maximum or minimum values 
occur or their sizes. Therefore, the model’s ability to reflect behavior should be 
based on its ability to show behavior modes, such as increases and decreases when 
they should occur and at increasing or decreasing rates of change.  
System dynamics models should be exposed to a variety of tests to improve 
their reflection of the target system and to develop confidence in the model’s 
                                            
28  See Ford and Sterman (1998) for a discussion of the use of work packages (development tasks) 
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usefulness for its intended purpose. Forrester and Senge (1980) suggest three types 
of tests of system dynamics models: structural similarity to the actual system, 
reasonable behavior over a wide range of input values, and behavior similarity to 
actual systems. Using several tests described by Sterman (2000), the model was 
tested for the structure’s similarity to system structure, consistency, reasonableness 
of behavior, and similarity of model behavior to system behavior.  
Basing the model on previously validated models, the literature and data 
collected about acquisition projects improves the model’s structural similarity to 
actual acquisition projects as practiced. Model behavior was tested with extreme 
input values—such as no discovery of errors and very large resource quantities and 
productivities—as well as more typical conditions. Model behavior remained 
reasonable across wide ranges of input values, including extreme values. For 
example, discovering no errors reduces durations but also decreases quality. These 
tests increase confidence that the model generates realistic project behavior 
patterns due to the same causal relations found in the type of projects investigated 
(i.e., generates “the right behavior for the right reasons”). 
The model also reproduces the known system behavior. Figure 22 shows the 
simulated the work in each phase that has been initially completed until the phase 
has released all work. The vertical axis of Figure 22 and subsequent graphs labeled 
“Work being Developed (work packages)” can also be interpreted as the amount of 
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Figure 22. Test of Model Ability to Simulate Development Phases and 
Overlapping—Active Phases in Javelin Project 
The simulated behavior of the Javelin project is consistent with the phase 
durations provided by the project manager, supporting the ability of the model to 
reflect the dynamics of the Javelin project. The simulated cost of the Javelin project 
($722million) is also consistent with the data provided by the project manager, 
supporting the ability of the model to reflect the Javelin project cost performance.  
Figure 23 shows the simulated performance risk for the Javelin project, the 
fraction of requirements satisfied by specific durations that can reflect deadlines. The 
model behavior is similar to the Javelin project, with a single testing phase of all 
requirements by users (one step) and the provision of all requirements (100% 
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Figure 23. Simulated Satisfaction of Javelin Requirements 
The model was also tested for its ability to simulate known and expected 
impacts of applying spiral or incremental development. If a model accurately reflects 
the impacts of incremental development, it should simulate that the same project 
with multiple development blocks provides some (but not all) requirements to users 
earlier, provides requirements in steps at the ends of development blocks, and 
probably provides all requirements later than the project if done in a single block. To 
test the model’s ability to reflect incremental development, the model as calibrated to 
the actual Javelin project was changed to reflect development in three blocks. The 
primary management decision required to implement this change is how many of the 
30 total requirements and other work to develop in each of the three blocks. For this 
test, it was assumed that the requirements were distributed evenly across the blocks 
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design components, and units to manufacture) were also distributed approximately 
evenly across development blocks.29  
Figure 24 shows the simulated performance risk of the Javelin project as 
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Figure 24. Test of Model Ability to Simulate Single-block and Incremental 
Development—Javelin Project in One (Line 1) and Three Even (Line 2) 
Development Blocks 
The model reflects the impacts of incremental development described. When 
compared to a traditional approach (line 1), the incremental approach (line 2) 
provides some requirements earlier, satisfies requirements in steps, and satisfies all 
                                            
29 An even distribution of scope across development blocks for all phases was chosen for clarity and 
consistency. In actual projects, the distributions would be determined by the needs of individual 
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requirements later. The simulation also supports an expected increase in cost from 
$722m for traditional to $1531m for spiral. The timing and sizes of the steps vary 
with the allocation of requirements and other work to blocks, resources and other 
model calibrations; but the changes in behavior mode support the model’s ability to 
reflect differences in acquisition strategy.  
As an additional test of the model, the size of the development staff was 
doubled for the Javelin calibration project. If the model reflects actual projects, this 
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Figure 25. Test of Model Ability to Simulate Impacts of Resources on 
Progress—Javelin Project in One Block (Line 1) and with more developers 
(Line 2) 
More resources generate products faster but at much higher cost. Doubling 
the number of developers saves 30 weeks (100% of requirements satisfied in week 
491 instead of week 521) but increases costs dramatically from $722m without the 
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Based on these and additional tests, the model is considered useful for the 
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Model Use 
Two focusing questions which address the issues revealed by the literature 
and case study portions of this report were used to guide model use:  
Q1: What are the impacts of a spiral/incremental development approach 
compared to a traditional single-block development strategy? 
Q2: How might successful spiral/incremental development project 
performance differ from the successful management of single-block 
development projects?  
The Impacts of Incremental Development on Acquisition 
Project Performance 
The first question is addressed by simulating the same project using a 
traditional single-block development strategy and an incremental development 
strategy and comparing the behavior of the two projects. As described above, the 
model structure includes the fundamental features that distinguish incremental 
development from traditional development (e.g., multiple development blocks, 
concurrent development blocks, additional start-up, reviews, contracting, etc.) and, 
therefore, can simulate behavioral and performance differences.  
The calibration project case (Javelin) fully satisfied all its requirements. 
However, not satisfying, or partially satisfying requirements reflects the project risk 
and is, therefore, an important performance measure. Therefore, to facilitate the 
comparison of project performance using different strategies, a Base Case project 
was created that does not fully satisfy all requirements based on the Javelin 
calibration project. Figure 26 shows the Performance Risk Profile of three project 
simulations: 1) the calibration project (Javelin), 2) the Base Case project (Javelin 
without 100% satisfaction) using a single-block strategy, and 3) the Base Case 
project using an incremental development strategy with the requirements and work 
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Figure 26. Performance Risk Profile of a Calibration, Base Case, and 
Incremental/Spiral Project 
Table 1 compares the performance of these three simulated projects. The first 
two performance measures reflect schedule performance with the project duration 
required to satisfy the first requirement and the project duration required to satisfy all 
the requirements that the project will satisfy. The third performance measure reflects 
cost performance with the estimated development cost. The last two performance 
measures reflect project risk with the percent of the total project requirements 
satisfied by a specific deadline. For Table 1, the deadline was chosen to be the time 
when the Base Case project using the traditional strategy satisfied all the 
















Base Case - 
traditional
Base Case - 
spiral
Duration to first 
requirement satisfied weeks 471 470 397
Duration to max. 
requirements satisfied weeks 520 518 762
Total development cost $1,000,000 722 719 1,555
Requirements satisfied 
by deadline % 100 91 18
Final requirements 













Table 1. Performance Comparison of Three Simulated Acquisition 
Projects 
Although simulated values are relative and not predictions, the results in 
Table 1 identify important impacts of incremental/spiral development on acquisition 
project performance when compared to a traditional single-block strategy. 
Underlined bold values in Table 1 indicate the best performance among the three 
projects for each performance measure. Values in bold italics indicate the worst 
performance among the three projects for each performance measure. Notice that 
compared with the Base Case—traditional project, the Base Case—spiral project is 
best in only one performance measurement (Duration to first requirement satisfied) 
but is worst in three other performance measurements (Duration to max. 
requirements satisfied, Total development cost, and Risk—requirements satisfied by 
deadline). This demonstrates the ubiquitous tradeoffs in performance that different 
strategies present. If all performance measures were valued equally, spiral 
development would appear to be a poor choice as an acquisition strategy. However, 
not all performance measures are of equal value in all acquisition projects. 
Consistent with the case studies and analysis above, these model results 
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development strategy to improve total project performance—Duration to first 
requirement satisfied.  
Causal Analysis and Explanations of Model Behavior 
Analyses of the structure of the model provide a means of explaining the 
results shown in Figure 26 and Table 1, i.e., why spiral development changes project 
performance the way it does. Here also lies an important definitional distinction: we 
use the term spirals and increments here somewhat interchangeably, since all 
spirals eventually become defined. But in precise terms, our model results here refer 
specifically to the effects of deliberate deferral of work to successive increments, 
versus the unplanned, inestimable and open-ended nature of true spiral 
development. To identify the causes of specific behaviors, the behavior of specific 
model variables is traced through the causal pathways in the model from a 
performance variable “backwards” up the causal pathway to reveal the drivers of, 
and constraints on, performance. For example, schedule performance is constrained 
by the progress rates of different blocks and phases, which can be constrained by 
either the availability of work or progress rates allowed by resources (the model 
structure analysis identifies which constrains progress). The availability of work can 
be constrained by the completion of upstream work or the amount of work remaining 
to be developed (again, model structure analysis reveals which controls). Resource 
rates can be constrained by either the quantity and productivity of developers or the 
quantity and productivity of project managers. Following the driving or constraining 
causal pathway through the model for the behavior of a specific performance 
variable for a specific simulation can reveal the locations of bottlenecks. The results 
of model structure analysis for each performance measure in Table 1 will be 
described in turn.  
Model structure analysis reveals that the “Duration to the first requirement 
satisfied” values are constrained by the time required to get the requirements and 
other development products in the first block through the development phases and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 95 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
development products are released to downstream phases. These phase durations 
are driven primarily by the progress rate, which is effected by the quantity and 
productivity of developers and the amount of work in each phase. Therefore, when 
the number of requirements and, therefore, work is reduced in the first development 
block of a spiral strategy, the block can be completed faster—satisfying the 
requirements in that block earlier.30 This explains why the Base Case: spiral project 
performs best in this performance measure. A shorthand description of this causal 
path from this performance variable through the project structure is: Duration to first 
requirement—end block 1—block 1 phase durations—block 1 work required—scope 
of block 1. A reasonable question that model structure analysis (and more 
simulations) can address is, “How much faster can spiral development satisfy 
requirements?” Further reductions in the number of requirements in the first block 
reduce the duration to the first requirement satisfied, but not proportionate to the 
reduction of requirements and only to a minimum duration. This is because 
developer progress rates are not the only project feature that constrains progress, 
i.e., are not the only potential bottleneck. In this case, concurrent development also 
increases project management needs, and project management resources begin to 
constrain progress at some point. In addition, available work constraints (i.e., 
development processes) have minimum durations and prevent the very early 
satisfaction of requirements. This illustrates the important role of multiple and 
dynamic progress bottlenecks.  
Model structure analysis reveals that the “Duration to maximum requirements 
satisfied” values are controlled by when the last requirement is satisfied, which is at 
the end of block 1 in the Base Case: traditional project and the end of block 3 of the 
Base Case: spiral project. In the Base Case: traditional project, this is controlled by 
the progress and concurrence of the phases. The progress is sometimes 
                                            
30 Note that if the reduction in the number of requirements in the first block was not accompanied by a 
reduction in the scope of the other phases in the first block, as suggested in the previous footnote, 
that the bottleneck in the first phase might not be addressed, and the improved performance might 
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constrained at some times by resources and at other times by processes. For 
example, the early portion of the requirements phase does not progress faster 
because of the number or productivity of developers, but later in the same phase the 
existing developers run out of work due to the process constraints of waiting for 
rework to be completed and errors to be discovered. The shifting of progress 
constraints illustrates the importance of understanding progress bottlenecks to 
successfully managing acquisition project dynamics. Considering the spiral project, 
process constraints such as the sequential development of requirements in separate 
blocks prevents the beginning of the requirements phase in the last block of the 
incremental/spiral development project until the requirements phases in the first two 
blocks are completed. This forces the final block to start relatively late (over three 
years into the project). This late start forces the third block to compete for project 
management and support resources with the first two blocks, which are in progress. 
Direct resources (developers) constrain the progress of the phases in block 3 and 
process constraints such as the sequential nature of the phases set a minimum 
duration for Block 3.31  A shorthand description of this causal path from this 
performance variable through the project structure is: Duration to maximum 
requirements—end last block—start of last requirements phase and [last block 
duration]—end of preceding requirements phase and [last block concurrence and 
direct resources]. The square brackets indicate a split in the causal pathway; i.e., 
that two paths constrain the end of the last block.  
Model structure analysis reveals that the “Total development cost” values are 
driven by the duration that the two types of resources, the development workforce 
and the project management workforce, are charged to the project (labor rates are 
assumed to include other expenses). These workforces are fully allocated to 
development or project management as long as they are needed (i.e., there are 
                                            
31 The impact of the sequential phases illustrates the benefits of concurrent development. See Ford 
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backlogs of work for the development workforce and development activities for the 
project management workforce). Therefore, costs are directly related to the duration 
of blocks and the project. Longer projects cost more. However, the driver of this total 
duration is the total amount of work to be completed. This consists of two types of 
work: work required to develop products (requirements, technologies, designs, 
products, test results), and indirect work to fulfill review, contracting, start-up, and 
other functions that are related to development phases. The more phases a project 
has, the more indirect work it must complete. Therefore, more development blocks 
increase indirect work, thereby increasing the project duration and costs. This 
explains why the Base Case: spiral project, which has more development blocks and 
phases than the other projects, has the largest cost.  A shorthand description of this 
causal path from this performance variable through the project structure is: Total 
cost—2 workforces—backlogs and activities—work required—start-up, reviews, etc. 
work—number of phases—number of blocks. 
Model structure analysis reveals that the “Requirements satisfied by deadline” 
values are driven by the satisfaction of requirements and the deadline chosen. For a 
given deadline, this performance measure depends on the progress of development 
blocks (described above) and, in the spiral development case, the number of 
requirements in each block (a project-planning decision). The dependence on the 
sizes of the blocks is particular to the spiral project because the structure of spiral 
development generates significant times of no increases in requirements satisfied. If 
one of these plateaus in final performance occurs at the deadline, the spiral project 
remains at a relatively low performance level. This is illustrated in Figure 26. This 
explains why the Base Case: spiral project has such a poor performance for this 
metric (Table 1). A shorthand description of this causal path from this performance 
variable through the project structure is: Requirements satisfied by deadline—
progress of blocks and [sizes of blocks]—backlogs and activities—work required—
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Model structure analysis reveals that the “Final requirements satisfied” values 
are driven by the total fraction of the requirements that pass testing by users. The 
model assumes that the users find all failures of the product to fully satisfy the 
requirements. Therefore, the defects found by users that limit the final requirements 
satisfied are those inherited by the user-testing phase from upstream phases. Three 
features determine the number of defects passed on to downstream phases and 
eventually to user testing: 1) the number of defects generated within a phase (e.g., a 
technology that cannot satisfy a requirement even if developed optimally), 2) the 
fraction of those defects not discovered and passed on to downstream phases 
(accidentally or purposeful32), and 3) the sensitivity of downstream phases to 
inherited upstream errors.33 More errors generated and passed on and more 
sensitivity to those errors degrades performance in this dimension. Because 
inherited errors generate more errors in the downstream phases, the effects are 
multiplicative and grow with delays in error discovery and correction. These features 
are often driven by the technological relations among requirements, technologies, 
and design components. However, they also can be influenced by managerial 
actions such as quality assurance policies and developer morale. The model 
assumes (for simplicity) that changing to a spiral approach does not change these 
factors. This explains why the Base Case: spiral project and Base Case: traditional 
project have the same performance. If the spiral project were to cause changes in 
these three features (e.g., an increase in errors generated due to more process 
complexity caused by concurrence), the performance would change. A shorthand 
description of this causal path from this performance variable through the project 
structure is: Final requirements satisfied—two workforces—backlogs and activities—
work required—start-up, reviews, etc., work—number of phases—number of blocks. 
                                            
32 See Ford and Sterman (2003a) for descriptions and analysis of the rational and purposeful hiding of 
known defects by qualified, well-intentioned project managers.  
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Investigating Incremental/Spiral Development Management  
The second research question focuses on the management of incremental or 
spiral development (terms used interchangeably here) projects: How can spiral 
development project performance be improved? A first step in improving the 
management of spiral development is to understand the managerial implications of 
spiral development. The graphics in Figure 27 show the active development phases 
of the Base Case project using a single development block (top) and spiral 




Figure 27. Active Development Phases using Single-block and Spiral 
Development—the Base Case Project 
Phases must be coordinated with external stakeholders and other 
development phases. Each pair of concurrent phases creates a potential interface 
that requires coordination. Figure 28 shows an estimate of the phase interfaces that 
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Figure 28. Performance Risk Profile of a Calibration, Base Case, and 
Spiral Project 
Although the number of interfaces with external stakeholders and between 
development phases is project-specific, the impact of spiral development on project 
management requirements is clear. Spiral development requires significantly more 
coordination than single-block development.  
The Critical Role of Progress Bottlenecks  
Bottlenecks that constrain development progress can be caused by several 
different parts of a development project and located in many places. Understanding 
and managing them effectively is critical to successful spiral development project 
success. This can be illustrated by simulating projects using spiral development with 
different amounts of resources—a common project-management tool. The Javelin 
Project was simulated assuming four conditions:  
1. a single-block approach (blue, Line 1 in Figure BBBB),  
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3. with spiral and additional developers (green, Line 3 in Figure BBBB),  
4. with spiral with additional developers and additional project 
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Figure 29. Different Impacts of Adding Resources on Performance—
Javelin Project with More Developers and Project Management 
Adding developers reduces the duration of block 2 (second and third steps 
are earlier), but not does not significantly change the first increment. This is because 
the first increment is constrained by process with significantly fewer developers than 
the second development block. This illustrates the importance of identifying and 
understanding the progress bottleneck. In this case, adding developers does not 
significantly reduce the first development block and would not be a very effective 
policy (or use of resources) if a project manager was attempting to speed up the 
time to First Unit Equipped with the requirements in the first block. Adding 
resources where they do not relax a progress constraint does not improve 
performance (an old lesson). Knowing where what project features constrain 
progress is particularly difficult in incremental/spiral development because of 
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improves performance if the management objective was to speed the time to the 
First Unit Equipped with requirements from the second block. Again, knowing where 
what project features constrain progress is critical for improving spiral development 
performance.  
The addition of project management in addition to developers (line 4 in Figure 
29) also illustrates the challenges and importance of identifying and understanding 
progress bottlenecks in spiral development. This only impacts the third development 
block. This is because, in the model as calibrated, the first two development blocks 
have adequate project management; therefore, adding more project management 
does not improve performance. In contrast, the third development block is (at least 
partially) constrained by project-management resources, and benefits from adding 
more project management. In this case, the location of the bottleneck shifts from 
developers to project managers and is different in different development blocks. The 
fundamental lesson from the model is the same: Understanding the location of 
progress bottlenecks is particularly difficult but vital for successful spiral 
development management.   
Of additional interest, the estimated costs of the four simulated Javelin 
projects shown in Figure 29 are:  
1. Single block: $704million 
2. Spiral: $939million 
3. Spiral with additional developers: $1,761million 
4. Spiral with additional developers and project management: 
$1,753million  
The first increase in cost from a single-block development ($704m) to a spiral 
development ($939m) is expected and has been discussed above. The second 
increase in cost from spiral development ($939m) to spiral development with more 
developers ($1,761m) is also expected and is due to the larger workforce. However, 
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developers and more project management ($1,753m) is counterintuitive. How can 
adding more resources (project management) decrease project costs? A causal 
path analysis of the model structure reveals that when project management 
resources constrain progress, adding those resources can reduce project duration, 
allowing an earlier release of the (expensive) developers from the project. Without 
the additional project management, some developers are unable to be fully utilized 
due to project management issues that are not being addressed. The additional 
project management relaxed that progress bottleneck, thereby allowing improved 
use of developers, faster completion of the project, and reduced costs. The counter-
intuitive cost behavior of these simulated projects illustrates the challenges 
and importance of identifying and understanding progress bottlenecks in 
spiral development projects.    
Simulation Modeling Results Summary 
The simulation model was used to investigate the impacts of spiral 
development on acquisition projects and the management of spiral development 
from a causal-path perspective. Spiral development was found to have several 
important impacts on acquisition projects when compared to a traditional single-
block development approach. Ceteris paribus (all other things held constant or 
equal), the model found, or supported other findings of, the following impacts:  
• Incremental/Spiral development can provide the First Unit Equipped 
with some (but not all) requirements satisfied faster than single-block 
development 
• Incremental/Spiral development provides satisfied requirements to 
users in multiple steps or increments, whereas single-block 
development satisfies all requirements in a single step 
• Incremental/Spiral development takes more time to satisfy all 
requirements than single-block development   
• Incremental/Spiral development costs more than single-block 
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• Incremental/Spiral development has a high risk of not satisfying all 
requirements by the time single-block development can satisfy all 
requirements  
• The causal paths that drive and constrain project performance in 
incremental/spiral development pass through multiple types of 
resources, development processes, and move across both 
development phases and development blocks. The causal paths vary 
widely for different performance measures. This makes the drivers of 
and constraints on spiral acquisition project performance more difficult 
to identify than those influencing single-block development projects 
These results indicate that incremental/spiral development is a significantly 
different approach to acquisition than single-block development; therefore, it requires 
different planning, resourcing, and management.  
The model was also used to investigate the management of spiral 
development when compared to traditional development. Spiral development was 
found to have several significant impacts on acquisition project management. 
Investigations with the model found that (ceteris paribus):  
• The concurrent use of multiple development blocks in spiral 
development significantly increases the number of development 
phases and activities that must be managed and coordinated at any 
given time compared to single-block development. This increases the 
project management needs for successful acquisition in spiral 
development projects when compared to single-block projects.  
• Like in single-block development, progress in spiral development 
requires the identification and understanding of progress bottlenecks. 
However, the concurrence and resulting complexity of development in 
spiral projects causes the types and locations of bottlenecks to vary 
widely and be more difficult to identify and address than those in 
single-block development.  
• Causal paths of the drivers and constraints on project performance and 
progress bottlenecks move from one feature of a project to another as 
projects evolve. The increased dynamics of development in spiral 
development projects when compared to single-block development 
make identifying and addressing causal paths and progress 
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• Progress bottlenecks can cause counterintuitive behavior, such as 
reductions in project cost by adding resources at a bottleneck. 
Understanding and exploiting the opportunities provided by these 
behaviors requires a deep understanding of the project structures and 
dynamic interactions that drive and constrain progress.  
These results indicate that incremental/spiral development requires more, 
different, and more difficult project management than single-block development that 
focuses on the identification and management of causal paths and progress 
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Balancing Risks with Development Approaches 
In 2004, Barry Boehm, creator of the spiral development model, released a 
book about software development entitled, Balancing Agility and Discipline. In this 
pragmatic book, he says that two opposing and conflicting methodologies have 
emerged in the software domain—that of traditional, plan-driven, processed-based 
(disciplined) and that of rapid change and adaptability (agile). Proponents of each of 
these software development approaches have their line of reasoning.  The 
traditionalists value consistency of processes, exemplified within the Software-
Capability Maturity Model (SW-CMM), and emphasize proper documentation to 
provide history and a knowledge base of experience. The agilists value rapid 
response to change versus following plans and functional software over 
comprehensive documentation.  Disciplined methods are systematic and 
predictable, but can become bureaucratic as quality-oriented and risk averse. Agile 
methods are dexterous, but can become ad hoc and chaotic.  Both value quality, but 
from differing viewpoints. Where the SW-CMM defines quality as specification and 
process compliance, agile methods view it as customer satisfaction. He asserts that 
the perplexing dilemma for project managers is the need for both coping with change 
and retaining control—since both approaches have their advantages and 
drawbacks.   
The two approaches have evolved over the past three decades and are still 
changing:  
Disciplined methods The plan-driven, disciplined approach emerged from 
systems engineering and quality disciplines because of 
the growing complexity of large aerospace programs. 
Software, as an essential but physically unconstrained 
component, grew to need “disciplining” via standards and 
structured techniques within a requirements/design/build 
paradigm. This gave rise to standards and repeatable 
processes, emphasis upon defined system architecture, 
verification and validation, and an analytical approach to 
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Agile methods The agile approach grew out of demands for faster 
product cycle-time, rapid prototyping experiences, and a 
philosophy favoring human interaction and flexibility 
versus mechanistic methods. Agile concepts are 
embracing informality, change, simplicity, many and 
frequent product releases, and “bare sufficiency” 
(addressing only high-priority functions). 
While Boehm describes evolutionary and incremental processes being used 
in both approaches, the DoD’s spiral development approach seems most analogous 
to Boehm’s agile methods. And Boehm states his own, “skepticism that pure agile 
methods can be used effectively with large, complex, or safety-critical software 
systems” (Boehm & Turner, 2004). He also attributes “over-responding to change” 
as causal “for the $3 billion overrun of the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
Advanced Automation System for national air traffic control” (2004). He conveys that 
agile methods are more risky, stating, “the necessity of discipline to ground 
adaptability is as necessary as it has ever been, especially as system software size 
and complexity grow” (2004).  
But also clear are the benefits of each of Boehm’s competing approaches. 
Discipline is needed as a control mechanism to avoid risk, but agility is needed to 
respond quickly to customer needs. He warns against the misuse and universal 
application of either, saying, “One size fits all is a myth” (Boehm & Turner, 2004) 
And he advocates a balanced approach between use of both methods—based upon 
cost, schedule and technical performance risk. In addition to organizational culture 
and developer personnel qualifications, he actually advocates the more disciplined, 
risk-averse approaches for projects that are mission/safety critical, larger in size, and 
have more stable requirements. 
We believe Boehm’s constructs about agile and disciplined software 
development methods correlate well with other, non-software product development 
strategies—especially with their regard to product characteristics and risk. Hardware 
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While Boehm suggests balancing agile and disciplined software development 
methods, we suggest there is also a need for balance within DoD’s evolutionary 
acquisition methodologies: the balancing of project-control measures oriented 
against risks.  Since both controls and risks have associated costs, the balance has 
long been conceptualized as in Figure 30 below (Wysocki, 2003). 
 
Figure 30. Perceived Relationships Among Project Cost, Control and Risk 
(adapted from Wysocki, 2003) 
Typical project goals are stability, discipline, simplicity and equilibrium. 
Program managers want these aspects with regard to program requirements, 
funding, design, and production configuration. But stakeholders often want flexibility, 
agility, adaptability and variety, and these bring about opposing tensions from 





















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 111 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Conclusions 
It can be summarized that spiral development was at its inception, and is at 
its extension by the DoD, all about risk. Paradoxically, it is an agile method 
envisioned to reduce risk, but which potentially can add its own. On the one hand, a 
spiral or incremental approach allays risk by reducing scope to render only the 
highest priority capabilities with the exclusive use of mature technology, and obtains 
early and continuous feedback from the environment for follow-on developments. On 
the other hand, it introduces concurrency during advanced development and adds 
variety in production, with all their attendant management challenges.  
Although today’s policy of evolutionary acquisition is prescribed as a 
development methodology, it is actually focused more upon what—not how—we 
develop. As such, it is about doable scope, reducing risk via exclusive use of mature 
technology.  The Cost As an Independent Variable and other requirement-limiting 
initiatives were earlier attempts to accomplish this by encouraging product-
performance trades to keep cost estimates fixed. As with CAIV, this likely means 
trading performance requirements for earliest deploying increments. 
Spiral development also seeks to spread out the technical risk over more 
development and process time via incrementing. We have shown with simulation 
that this can potentially improve risk-management performance initially, but with 
higher overall costs and longer subsequent development durations, if deliberately 
deferring known, estimable work.  As such, our computational modeling indicates 
that incremental development costs more and requires more time to provide the 
same requirements than single-step development. With regard to project risk, the 
increased complexity in a project using an incremental or spiral approach makes the 
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The policy change is that spiral development now includes undefinitized 
increments and prescribes incremental development instead of single-step 
development. All amorphous spirals will eventually become defined increments— 
mini-programs. In years past, they have often been implemented as sequential, 
separate, and successive product upgrades (such as the CH-47, UH-60, C-130, B-
52 program examples). But current policy expresses these as more concurrent, 
frequent and continuous. Such concurrency adds complexity to development 
models, with attendant risks of over allocation of work, noise, error, duplicity, and 
other inefficiencies from work deferral and divided effort in project-management 
organizations. Additional oversight, reviews, contracting, testing, etc., will also likely 
affect transaction costs. If all requirements are known and an incremental approach 
is used, then there is a deliberate deferral of work to later increments, and there will 
be a resultant increase in total development costs and durations for these same 
reasons. 
We’ve suggested that a one-size-fits-all methodology for DoD system 
development may not be appropriate and have offered for consideration several 
product attributes that might help determine the efficacy of the spiral approach. We 
further suggest that spiral development may serve better than single-step 
development for initial capability when products are mutable, time critical, non-
maintenance intensive, and have continuous (vs. binary) or uncertain requirements, 
short cycle-times (less knock-on effects), sequentially phased development, and 
modular independence. In contrast, spiral development may not be appropriate 
when there are safety or man-rating concerns and have attributes opposite to those 
above.  In particular, PMs should understand the nature of their product 
requirements with regard to their range of attainment and relative to key parameters 
of capability, and vis-à-vis the readiness level of their enabling technologies. Some 
key features may indeed be binary, and others may have significant ramifications of 
partial attainment—such as propagated change across the entire product 
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Open design standards will not always be incorporable, and product variety 
will emerge, with and without backward compatibility, interoperability, etc. Variety is 
both an asset (for end-users) and a liability (for manufacturers, owners and 
supporters). As such, to compensate for product variety, “acquirers” must “own” the 
design and emphasize configuration management, keeping or assigning 
responsibility for that function and maintaining accountability for it. 
Our title, “From Amorphous to Defined,” alludes to both product specification 
as well as risk realization in spiral development. Spiral development has inherent 
challenges, both strategic and tactical, of which PMs must be aware. We’ve 
highlighted and illustrated them here, as well as have shown that spiral development 
can indeed work—especially for technically mature and mutable products with open 
or elegant architecture. 
Program Managers must be aware of these inherent risks and take necessary 
precautions to balance them with increased use of tools, such as technology 
readiness levels, configuration management, technical performance measurement, 
contract incentives, options and phasing, organizational design, etc.  
Stability is the quest in all things programmatic—for funding, requirements, 
design, production configuration, etc. But in an unstable world, and with the future 
being necessarily uncertain, the tension between control and change is probably 
unending. PMs do have some tools for coping, and being forewarned is being 
forearmed. PMs are used to concurrency and change, as they are largely what make 
project management what it is: a balancing act. Mechanisms for control of risk 
include project management tools such as configuration management, technical 
performance measurement, earned-value management, risk management, real 
options, etc. Organizational and cultural factors such as leadership, trust and 
accountability play a significant role as well (Zolin & Dillard, 2005, May). Successful 
use of these tools to balance control and risk in projects with a high rate of change 
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Recommendations for Practice: 
1. Project managers need to be aware of the inherent risks of spiral 
development and take necessary precautions to balance those risks. 
Many tools and control measures are currently developed and 
available to assist project managers in balancing the risks of spiral 
development, such as technology readiness levels, configuration 
management, technology performance management, real options, 
project phasing, risk management, earned value management and 
organizational design.  
2. Incremental and spiral development projects provide additional 
opportunities for managing development risks that are inherent in the 
project design. These include project planning decisions about the 
number and concurrency of development blocks, and the requirements 
and associated technologies and design components to be included in 
specific blocks. This planning provides opportunities to anticipate 
where critical progress bottlenecks may occur and design how to best 
monitor and respond to them.  
3. Product attributes may help determine the suitability of spiral 
development. PMs should consider such characteristics as: mutability, 
time criticality, man-rating, modular interdependency, key parameters 
of capability versus range of requirement attainment (i.e. binary vs. 
continuous), and the relative amount of concurrency among 
increments.  
4. Progress bottlenecks in incremental and spiral development often 
oscillate between process constraints (e.g. availability of work due to 
upstream progress) and resource constraints (e.g. developer or project 
management quantities or productivities). Successfully addressing a 
constraining progress bottleneck often shifts the progress constraint to 
a different location in the project. Therefore, a structured and 
interdisciplinary practice of identifying and addressing bottlenecks can 
improve performance.  
5. Configuration management accountability must be assigned and kept 
to maintain supportability, failure mode identification and causality and 
prevent the variety generated by evolutionary acquisition from reducing 
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Appendix 1. UH-60 Series Helicopter Variants 
Introduced Between 1979-2007 
• UH-60A Black Hawk - Original U.S. Army version deployed in 1979, carrying 
a crew of four and up to 11 passengers. Equipped with T-700-GE-700 
engines.  
• UH-60A RASCAL - NASA-modified version for the Rotorcraft-Aircrew 
Systems Concepts Airborne Laboratory.  
• EH-60A Black Hawk - Modified electrical system and stations for two 
electronic systems mission operators. 
• MH-60A Black Hawk - Modified with additional avionics, precision navigation 
system, FLIR and air-to-air refueling capability. Equipped with T-700-GE-701 
engines. 
• YEH-60B Black Hawk - UH-60A modified for special radar and avionics 
installations, prototype for stand-off target acquisition system. 
• SH-60B Seahawk - The United States Navy's sea-going version. Based on 
UH-60A but with Mark III avionics. Equipped with T-700-GE-401 engines. 
• UH-60C Black Hawk - Modified version for C2 missions.  
• EH-60C Black Hawk - UH-60A modified with special electronics equipment 
and external antenna. 
• VH-60D Nighthawk - VIP-configured HH-60D, used for Presidential transport. 
T-700-GE-401 engines. 
• SH-60F Seahawk - Navy upgrade version, received in 1988, equipped with 
dipping sonar. 
• NSH-60F Seahawk - Modified SH-60F to support the VH-60N Cockpit 
Upgrade Program. 
• HH-60G Pave Hawk - Modified UH-60A primarily designed for combat search 
and rescue. It is equipped with a rescue hoist with a 200 ft (60.96 m) cable 
that has a 600 lb (270 kg) lift capability, and a retractable in-flight refueling 
probe. 
• MH-60G Pave Hawk - Special Operations version, equipped with long-range 
fuel tanks, air-to-air refueling capability, FLIR, improved radar. T-700-GE-
700/701 engines. 
• HH-60H Sea Hawk - Modified SH-60F with both offensive and defensive 
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• HH-60J Jayhawk - The United States Coast Guard version, equipped with a 
rescue hoist with a 200 ft (60.96 m) cable that has a 600 lb (270 kg) lift 
capability.  
• MH-60K Blackhawk - Special operations modification,  
• UH-60L Black Hawk - UH-60A with upgraded T-700-GE-701C engines, 
improved durability gearbox, and additional vibration absorbers. 
• EUH-60L - Modified with additional mission electronic equipment for Army 
Airborne C2. 
• EH-60L Black Hawk - EH-60A with major mission equipment upgrade. 
• HH-60L - UH-60L extensively modified in 1989 with medical mission 
equipment. Components include an external rescue hoist, integrated patient 
configuration system, and aircrew positions relocated to the back of the cabin.  
• MH-60L Direct Action Penetrator (DAP) - Special operations modification, 
operated by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. It is capable of 
being armed with 30mm chain gun and 2.75" rockets, as well as M134D 
gatling guns operated as door guns or fixed forward.  
• UH-60M Black Hawk - UH-60L upgraded with improved design "wide chord" 
rotor system, T-700-GE-701D Engines, improved durability gearbox, 
integrated Vehicle Management Systems (IVHMS) computer, and modern 
"Glass Cockpit" flight instrument suite. Planned to replace all UH-60A and L 
aircraft with the U.S. Army. 
• HH-60M - UH-60A with medical mission equipment. 
• VH-60N Nighthawk - Modified HH-60D used for Presidential transport. 
• UH-60Q Black Hawk - UH-60A modified for medical evacuation. 
• YMH-60R Sea Hawk - Prototype for MH-60R. T-700-GE-701C engines. 
• MH-60R Sea Hawk - Modified SH-60B for multiple mission use. T-700-GE-
401 engines. 
• SH-60R Sea Hawk - Modified SH-60B with improved radar and sonar 
systems. 
• NSH-60R Sea Hawk - U.S. Navy special testing version. T-700-GE-701C 
engines. 
• CH-60S Sea Hawk - Upgrade of UH-60L and SH-60R for cargo transport. 
• MH-60S - Navy medical evacuation and ship replenishment mission 
equipped. T-700-GE-401 engines. 
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Appendix 2. C-130 Hercules Aircraft Variants 
Introduced Between 1956-2007 
• The C-130A entered initial production with four Allison T56-A-11 or -9 
turboprops engines. A total of 219 were ordered and deliveries began in 
December 1956.  
• The C-130B introduced Allison T56-A-7 turboprops and the first of 134 
entered Air Force service in May 1959. 
• The C-130E was introduced in August of 1962 with a production run of 389, 
using the same Allison T56-A-7 engine, but adding two 1,290 gallon external 
fuel tanks and an increased maximum takeoff weight capability.  
o Speed: 345 mph at 20,000 feet  
o Ceiling: 19,000 feet with 42,000 pounds payload  
o Maximum Allowable Payload: 42,000 pounds  
o Range at Maximum Normal Payload: 1,150 miles  
• The C-130H was introduced in June 1974 as the first of 308 with the more 
powerful Allison T56-A-15 turboprop engine delivering 4,591prop shaft 
horsepower. Nearly identical to the C-130E externally, the new engine 
brought major performance improvements to the aircraft.  
o Speed: 366 mph at 20,000 feet 
o Ceiling: 23,000 feet with 42,000 pounds payload.  
o Maximum Allowable Payload: 42,000 pounds 
o Range at Maximum Normal Payload: 1,208 miles 
• The C-130J entered the inventory in February 1999. With a six-bladed 
composite propeller coupled to a 4,700 horsepower Rolls-Royce AE2100D3 
turboprop engine, the C-130J brings substantial performance improvements 
over all previous models.  
o Speed: 417 mph at 22,000 feet  
o Ceiling: 28,000 with 42,000 pounds payload  
o Maximum Allowable Payload: 42,000 pounds   
o Range at Maximum Normal Payload: 2,071 miles 
• The C-130J-30, a stretch version with a 15-foot fuselage extension.  To date, 
the Air Force has taken delivery of 37 C-130J aircraft from Lockheed Martin 
Aeronautics Company.  
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o Ceiling: 26,000 feet with 44,000 pounds payload.  
o Maximum Allowable Payload: 44,000 pounds  
o Range at Maximum Normal Payload: 1,956 miles 
• The AC-130H/U Gunship is a heavily armed, incorporating side-firing 
cannons integrated with sophisticated sensor, navigation and fire control 
systems to provide surgical firepower or area saturation during extended loiter 
periods, at night and in adverse weather. The AC-130U (deployed 1995) 
employs synthetic apertures strike radar for long-range target detection and 
identification. The navigational devices include the inertial navigation systems 
and global positioning system. The AC-130U employs the latest technologies 
and can attack two targets simultaneously. It also has twice the munitions 
capacity of the AC-130H (deployed 1972). 
• The MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130H Combat Talon II provide 
infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces and 
equipment in hostile or denied territory. 
• The MC-130P Combat Shadow features improved navigation, 
communications, threat detection and countermeasures systems. The 
Combat Shadow fleet has a fully integrated inertial navigation and global 
positioning system, and night vision goggle compatible interior and exterior 
lighting. 
• The MC-130W (deployed 2006) is a highly modified C-130H featuring 
improved navigation, threat detection and countermeasures, and 
communication suites, with air refuel capability for special operations 
helicopters. 
• The WC-130H Hercules is configured with computerized weather 
instrumentation for penetration of severe storms to obtain data on storm 
movements, dimensions and intensity. The WC-130B became operational in 
1959, the E model in 1962, followed by the H model in 1964. Only the H 
model is currently in operation. The WC-130J, currently in testing, is 
scheduled to replace the WC-130H.  
(US Air Force, 2007, February 25)  
Not an inclusive list; the authors have found a total of 24 Hercules C-130 variants 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 129 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Initial Distribution List 
1. Defense Technical Information Center       2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944; Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013        2 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5100 
3. Research Office, Code 09          1 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5138 
4. Robert N. Beck             1 
Dean, GSBPP 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
5. Keith F. Snider             1 
Associate Professor, GB/Sk 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
6. James B. Greene             1 
Acquisition Chair, GB/Jg 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
7. Bill Gates              1 
Associate Dean for Research, GB/Gt 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. John Dillard             1 
Senior Lecturer, GB/Dj 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
9. David N. Ford          1 
Zachry Department of Civil Engineering 
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-3136 
 
10. Karey L. Shaffer             1 
Program Manager, Acquisition Research Program, GB/Ks 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
 
 
Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our 



















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 131 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2003 - 2006 Sponsored Acquisition Research 
Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Managing Services Supply Chain 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 Spiral Development 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
Contract Management 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 Contractors in 21st Century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution 
Financial Management 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Capital Budgeting for DoD 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = 132 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Acquisitions via leasing: MPS case 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
Logistics Management 
 R-TOC Aegis Microwave Power Tubes 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 Army LOG MOD 
 PBL (4) 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 RFID (4) 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to Aegis and SSDS 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research within the Acquisition 
Research Program are available on our website: www.acquisitionresearch.org    
 
 
 
  
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
